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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Every year, the federal government distributes $11 billion in education benefits to 
nearly one million veterans (GAO, 2013). Despite the substantial price tag and reach of 
these benefits, we understand very little about how veteran students fare in postsecondary 
programs and why outcomes may be different for veteran students. Theory and related 
evidence predict that veteran students should be less successful than their nonveteran 
peers, yet the limited past research suggests that they are actually as successful as, if not 
more successful than, nonveterans. This is the student veteran paradox. I posit seven 
potential explanations to resolve this paradox: bias in past research, background 
characteristics of veterans, enrollment behaviors of veterans, maturation from delayed 
entry, education aid benefits for veterans, unobservable factors associated with selection 
into the military, or the direct effects of military service. I use OLS regression and 
logistic regression to assess three metrics of student success: grades, retention, and 
completion. I also leverage variations in the GI Bill program to assess whether higher 
levels of funding lead to better student success outcomes. Finally, I use matching to test 
whether unobservable factors associated with military enlistment or the direct effects of 
military service could drive veteran student success. Student veterans hold many 
characteristics that predict lower probabilities of college success, but veterans and 
nonveterans generally have similar academic outcomes. When controlling for background 
characteristics, enrollment patterns, age, and term of entry, predicted first year GPA is 
lower for veterans, but veterans are more likely to return after the first year and are more 
likely to graduate. Generally, students with higher levels of veteran education benefits 
xii 
 
have better retention and graduation outcomes, but aid levels seem to have little impact 
on first year grades. Veterans still have lower grades than similar matched nonveterans, 
but the veterans are more likely to return after the first year and are more likely to 
graduate. For retention and graduation, these results rule out the bias, background 
characteristics, and maturation explanations, but support the enrollment patterns and 
funding explanations. The results are consistent with the direct effects explanation, but 
the selection explanation cannot be ruled out completely. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Purpose 
Every year, the federal government distributes $11 billion in education benefits to 
nearly one million veterans (GAO, 2013). Despite the substantial price tag and reach of 
these benefits, we understand very little about how veteran students fare in the 
postsecondary programs these benefits subsidize. Additionally, we know little about why 
those outcomes may be different for veteran students.  
Limitations in available data have constrained prior research on student veterans. 
Publicly available datasets either systematically exclude most veterans through sampling 
procedures or only include veterans and, thus, lack mechanisms to make fair comparisons 
with nonveteran students. Despite these limitations, past research has generally found that 
veterans perform as well as or better than nonveterans in higher education. These findings 
are surprising because theory and evidence from analogous research fields suggest that 
veterans should perform worse. Student veterans, for example, are more likely to be 
male, to be older, to have disabilities—all of which have negative effects on student 
success. Additionally, related research has shown that veterans have worse labor market 
outcomes than comparable nonveterans. 
Are student veterans actually performing as well in college as nonveterans, and, if 
so, why? To understand the apparent paradox that veteran students exhibit in 
postsecondary outcomes, I examine the issue within a competing hypothesis framework. I 
propose seven ways to make sense out of this paradox. The observed veteran advantage 
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could be due to: 1) bias introduced through data and methodology limitations; 2) 
differences in background characteristics between veterans and nonveterans; 3) 
differences in enrollment behaviors between veterans and nonveterans; 4) maturity gains 
from entering college at a slightly older age; 5) education funding benefits from the GI 
Bill and related programs; 6) unobservable factors associated with selection into the 
military; or 7) the direct effects of military service. Although these explanations are 
exhaustive, they’re not mutually exclusive. Some combination of these explanations is 
possible, although they all cannot be true.  
To examine the seven hypotheses, I use an institutional dataset of Georgia State 
University (GSU) student records to assess student veteran college success outcomes in a 
large, public university. The GSU data includes the entire population of students entering 
the university between 2003 and 2015. The use of GSU data avoids many of the 
significant limitations and problems that are associated with other datasets that have been 
or could be used to examine postsecondary outcomes of veteran students. I use a mix of 
methodological approaches to examine the hypotheses. Testing each hypothesis will shed 
light on the underlying causal mechanisms that contribute to the veteran advantage in 
postsecondary education. While the findings are important for understanding college 
success for veteran students, the results will also yield policy implications for nonveteran 
students as well. 
 
1.2 Policy Relevance 
Additional evidence regarding each of the seven competing hypotheses will be 
highly relevant for policymaking. The results will be relevant regardless of whether they 
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support or undermine each hypothesis. Evidence surrounding the bias hypothesis 
probably has the greatest potential for impacting policy. If veterans are more likely to 
drop out of college than nonveterans, then veterans aren’t meeting the full education 
potential that the GI Bill enables. Since employment and income outcomes are 
substantially better for degree holders than those who drop out of college, it’s important 
to understand the value of the benefits veterans are receiving from the publicly funded 
provisions of the GI Bill and related programs. Moreover, if results indicate that veterans 
are less successful than nonveterans, program structures could be altered to better support 
veterans who attend college. 
Degree completion among veterans is also relevant to the larger national 
conversation on college completion. Many states have now publicly pledged to increase 
the proportion of the labor force that holds a postsecondary degree or certificate. Some 
states have also implemented performance-based funding systems for their public 
colleges and universities. Under these systems, all or part of a school's appropriation from 
the state is determined by degree completion numbers, rather than enrollment numbers 
(as has traditionally been the case). Since these funding structures could perversely 
incentivize limiting college access for groups with historically low completion rates, the 
funding formulas also include weights to encourage the enrollment of higher-risk 
students (e.g., first-generation students). New York included veteran students in these at-
risk groups for funding-formula purposes, but Ohio ultimately chose not to include 
veterans after deliberate consideration (National Conference of State Legislatures 2015, 
Ohio Board of Regents 2012). Veteran students aren't given extra weight under the 
proposed formulation in Georgia, putting the state in line with most states that have taken 
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up the issue of performance-based funding (State of Georgia Higher Education Funding 
Commission 2012, National Conference of State Legislatures 2015). If administrators 
suspect that veterans will be less likely to complete degree programs (even if that hunch 
is completely unsubstantiated), then veterans could face declining access to 
postsecondary education in states with performance-based funding formulas that neglect 
veterans. If the past research is misleading and veterans actually are less likely to finish, 
then these policies can incorporate protections for veteran students. Providing more 
reliable research on college success for student veterans can combat clichés and 
stereotypes in other settings as well.  
Accurately assessing the postsecondary success outcomes for veteran students 
will improve the situation for veteran students, regardless of the results. If veteran 
students fare just as well as nonveteran students in terms of retention and degree 
completion, then myths about the quality of veteran students can be dispelled. If veteran 
students are actually less successful than nonveteran students, then policies for 
performance-based funding can be better structured with incentives to protect veteran 
students. Moreover, colleges and universities can also redirect institutional resources to 
better serve their veteran students. 
If the veteran advantage is due to the education funding benefits bestowed upon 
veterans, then this has implications more broadly for education finance. Veteran 
education benefits are unique among large-scale student aid programs in that they are 
neither need-based nor academic merit-based. Additionally, continued funding does not 
depend on satisfying requirements regarding grades or academic progress. If this type of 
funding is an effective tool for improving student success, it might be used by the public 
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or nonprofit sectors for other groups with lower college completion rates (e.g., 
minorities) or other groups that deserve benefits (e.g., mothers). Additionally, 
policymakers might consider extending comparable levels of service-based aid benefits to 
induce participation in other public service ventures, such as the Peace Corps, 
AmeriCorps, or Teach for America. 
If veteran students actually benefit from entering college slightly older, then this 
implies revisions for traditional college completion strategies. Delayed entry into college 
has been discouraged in the US, especially in recent years. Finding support for the 
maturation hypothesis would suggest that this strategy is misguided and that delaying 
entry could improve the odds of college success (at least for certain kinds of students).  
If the veteran advantage is due to the direct effects of military service, then this 
suggests that the chances of college success can increase by undertaking military service 
or similar activities (at least for some individuals). Like the maturation hypothesis, 
finding support for the service effects hypothesis implies that at least some students will 
benefit from delaying entry into college. However, support for this hypothesis would also 
suggest that this interim period be used for military service or other activities that 
cultivate the same qualities as the military. These other activities could include other 
public service initiatives such as the Peace Corps or AmeriCorps. Encouraging the 
eventual college-bound individuals to take service-based gap years before enrollment 
would yield not only individual benefits from bolstering the odds of student success, but 
also public benefits stemming from the public service activities undertaken during this 
period. 
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The selection hypothesis is also relevant for public policy, albeit less than the 
other hypotheses. Finding support for this claim would imply that those who choose to 
enlist have certain qualities that give them an advantage in situations like college. This 
also implies that said qualities will be advantageous in certain employment situations. 
Groups working on veterans’ employment in the public (e.g., Department of Veterans 
Affairs, Department of Labor) and nonprofit (e.g., Hire Heroes USA) sectors could 
harness this knowledge to improve labor market outcomes for veterans. Moreover, 
governments could also utilize this knowledge to adjust veterans’ preference systems to 
steer veterans toward jobs that leverage those characteristics. 
 
1.3 Contribution to the Literature 
I build on an uneven body of literature that assesses student success outcomes for 
veterans in postsecondary education.  Most of the work in this area has focused on grades 
as a short-term metric for student success. Differences between veteran and nonveteran 
students in long-term metrics like first year retention and degree completion have largely 
been neglected.  This has mostly been due to the significant limitations in publicly 
available data for identifying and/or tracking student veterans. I use a unique dataset of 
institutional student records from Georgia State University (GSU) to provide the first 
reliable assessments of retention and completion in a public university.  
The use of GSU data avoids many of the significant limitations that are associated 
with other datasets that have been used to examine postsecondary outcomes of veteran 
students. The nationally representative, publicly available datasets with relevant variables 
either do not properly identify and track veterans, or they misclassify their educational 
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outcomes. The most frequently used dataset for tracking postsecondary outcomes is the 
Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), 
which uses data reported by higher education institutions. However, IPEDS data only 
includes first-time, full-time freshmen that begin in the fall semester. This excludes about 
37% of the total undergraduate population (Snyder and Dillow, 2013, p. 326). Moreover, 
veterans are likely to be overrepresented in this excluded group since they are more likely 
than traditional direct-from-high-school students to attend part-time (due to families, 
jobs, etc.), enter in the spring or summer (depending sometimes on when deployment 
ends), or transfer from a 2-year to a 4-year school. Other postsecondary datasets from the 
Department of Education are similarly problematic in that they include veterans but are 
only cross-sectional and do not track outcomes (in the case of the National Postsecondary 
Student Aid Study), or are longitudinal but make similar exclusions about first-time 
student status (in the case of the Beginning Postsecondary Students). Data from the 
Census Bureau (including the decennial census, the American Community Survey, and 
the Current Population Survey) is extensive and includes information on veteran status, 
but lacks sufficient detail on educational attainment outcomes. Census data uses the 
"some college, no degree" category to include not only dropouts from associates and 
bachelor’s degree programs, but also students who have successfully completed 
postsecondary certificate programs. Since census data is self-reported, it is also more 
susceptible to errors due to misunderstanding or misrepresentation. The decennial 
National Survey of Veterans does have data on post-secondary outcomes, but it is also 
self-reported and only includes veterans. A recent initiative to assess veteran student 
success called the Million Records Project relies on education records rather than self-
 8 
 
reporting, but it too only includes veterans. For both the National Survey of Veterans and 
the data from the Million Records Project, the exclusion of nonveterans prevents making 
fair comparisons between veterans and nonveterans with regard to postsecondary 
education outcomes.  
This is the first methodologically rigorous study to assess postsecondary student 
success among contemporary veterans. No study to date has used a multivariate analysis 
of retention and completion metrics to disentangle the effects of military service from 
other variables that are highly correlated with both veteran status and student success. 
This study is also one of the few to examine the effects of service-based financial aid, as 
distinct from need-based aid and academic merit-based aid. 
 
1.4 Overview of Chapters 
This dissertation includes six chapters. In chapter 2, I review the theoretical 
foundations underpinning my hypotheses and discuss the current evidence on 
postsecondary success for veteran students. I show that two threads of the literature lead 
to the student veteran paradox: theory and related evidence predict that veteran students 
should be less successful than their nonveteran peers, yet the limited past research 
suggests that they are actually as successful as, if not more successful than, nonveterans. I 
posit seven potential explanations to resolve this paradox: bias in past research, 
background characteristics of veterans, enrollment behaviors of veterans, maturation 
from delayed entry, education aid benefits for veterans, unobservable factors associated 
with selection into the military, or the direct effects of military service. In chapter 3, I 
discuss the GSU dataset and detail my methodological approach. I use OLS regression 
 9 
 
and logistic regression to assess three metrics of student success: grades, retention, and 
completion. I also leverage variations in the GI Bill program to assess whether higher 
levels of funding lead to better student success outcomes. Finally, I use matching to test 
whether unobservable factors associated with military enlistment or the direct effects of 
military service could drive veteran student success. In chapters 4 and 5, I present and 
discuss the results of the analyses. Student veterans hold many characteristics that predict 
lower probabilities of college success, but veterans and nonveterans generally have 
similar academic outcomes. When controlling for background characteristics, enrollment 
patterns, age, and term of entry, predicted first year GPA is lower for veterans, but 
veterans are more likely to return after the first year and are more likely to graduate. 
Generally, students with higher levels of veteran education benefits have better retention 
and graduation outcomes, but aid levels seem to have little impact on first year grades. 
Veterans still have lower grades than similar matched nonveterans, but the veterans are 
more likely to return after the first year and are more likely to graduate. In chapter 6, I 
discuss what these findings mean within the competing hypothesis framework and their 
further real-world implications. For retention and graduation, these results rule out the 
bias, background characteristics, and maturation explanations, but support the enrollment 
patterns and funding explanations. The results are consistent with the direct effects 
explanation, but the selection explanation cannot be ruled out completely. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This research examines postsecondary student success for veterans and what 
drives those outcomes. This chapter reviews bodies of literature to show how researchers 
have measured postsecondary student success, why veterans and nonveterans might 
perform differently on these measures, and what past research has shown regarding 
veteran success on these metrics and in related areas.  
Researchers typically use three different measures of postsecondary student 
success: grades, retention, and graduation. These student success outcomes could vary 
between veterans and nonveterans for several reasons. Student veterans are more likely 
than nonveterans to be male, black, Hispanic, lower socioeconomic status, less 
academically prepared, nontraditional students, disabled, and less integrated (both 
academically and socially). Past research has shown that student success outcomes are 
worse for students who hold each of these characteristics. On the other hand, veteran 
students usually receive generous financial benefits for education, and having unmet 
financial need inhibits student success. Additional important factors associated with 
student success include discontinuous enrollment, course withdrawals, and college GPA, 
but no research examines whether these vary between veterans and nonveterans. Past 
research on veteran success has shown that veterans have worse labor market outcomes 
than nonveterans. However, prior work on student success for veterans has shown that 
  11 
veterans are as successful as nonveterans; some even conclude that student veterans 
perform better than nonveterans on student success outcomes.  
These lines of research lead to a paradox: theory and related research predict that 
student veterans should be less successful than nonveteran peers, but the limited research 
on student veteran success indicates that veterans are at least as successful as, if not more 
successful than, nonveterans. I offer seven explanations that can potentially resolve this 
paradox and provide research hypotheses suggested by each. I conclude by summarizing 
and looking ahead to the next chapter.  
 
2.2 Measures of Postsecondary Student Success 
Researchers use three primary metrics to gauge postsecondary student success. 
The simplest is grades. Grades can measure short-term student success during a single 
semester or course (e.g., McGregor, Reece, and Garner, 1997). More frequently, grades 
are averaged over an academic year–typically the first year (e.g., Kuh et al., 2008).  
Persistence, or retention, examines whether students who initially enroll return to 
college in subsequent semesters. These terms are typically used interchangeably, but 
some researchers use retention with reference to the institutional perspective (i.e., 
whether a student returns to her initial institution) and use persistence with reference to 
the student perspective (i.e., whether a student returns to college, perhaps somewhere 
different from her initial institution). Researchers typically measure persistence after the 
first academic year, from fall-to-fall semesters (e.g., Kuh et al., 2008; Snyder and Dillow, 
2013), or, less commonly, between fall and spring semesters or through the second or 
third academic year. 
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Degree completion, or graduation, indicates that a student successfully finished 
the degree or certificate program in which he or she initially enrolled. Program 
completion has wider implications than the other success outcomes, as those who finish 
degrees are more likely to get jobs and tend to make more money than those who drop 
out of postsecondary programs. As a result, researchers and stakeholders have shown 
substantial interest in degree completion in recent years. Researchers measure completion 
rates across various time spans, but most do so at 150% of typical program length (e.g., 
those who finished an associate’s degree within 3 years of beginning, or finished a 
bachelor’s degree within 6 years of beginning) (e.g., Snyder and Dillow, 2013). 
Occasionally, researchers use shorter or longer periods (e.g., Adelman, 1999, 2006; 
Goldin et al., 2006). 
These three metrics are obviously interconnected. Earning poor grades can 
preclude retention, and returning to an institution is necessary to eventually graduate 
(although a student could skip the second fall semester before returning to finish). As one 
would expect, students who make good grades are more likely to persist throughout the 
first year, and persistence is a necessary prerequisite for degree completion. 
 
2.3 Factors Associated with Veteran Status and  
Postsecondary Student Success 
Some factors associated with being a veteran are also correlated with college 
success. These can distort the relationship between veteran status and student success if 
they aren’t statistically accounted for. These factors could cause veterans to perform 
differently than nonveteran students in college. 
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2.3.1 Sex 
Sex is the most notable factor: the vast majority of student veterans are men, but 
men are less likely than women to succeed in college. Diversity in the US military has 
increased over time as positions that have historically only been open to men have been 
opened to women as well. Women made up only 1.6% of those enlisted for active duty 
when the all-volunteer force began in 1973, but comprised 14.8% in 2014 (Office of the 
Under Secretary for Defense 2015, Table D-13). As the military is still disproportionately 
male, consequently, so are veterans. As of 2010, women comprised only about 8% of the 
total veteran population, although they represent a growing segment of veterans (Patten 
and Parker 2011). Women hold a larger share of the student veteran population than of 
the overall veteran population, presumably reflecting the broader trend in which women 
are more likely to pursue higher education. Both Radford and Wun (2009) and Cole and 
Kim (2013) report that about 27% of undergraduate military students1 are women, 
although Cate (2014b) reports that 21.1% of student veterans between 2002 and 2010 
were women.  
Women currently outperform men on all metrics of postsecondary success. 
Women are more likely than men both to attend and to graduate from college (e.g., 
Freeman 2004). Among new high school graduates in 2011, 72% of women enrolled in a 
2- or 4-year college, but only 65% of the men did (Snyder and Dillow, 2013, p. 333). The 
share of degrees earned annually by women has increased steadily since 1970, with 
                                                        
1 Veteran, active duty, and reserves are combined into one category in these analyses, 
though veterans make up nearly 75% of the combined group. 
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women overtaking men as the majority in 1978 at the associate’s level and in 1982 at the 
bachelor’s level (Snyder and Dillow, 2013, p. 448). Women earned 57% of the bachelor’s 
degrees and 62% of the associate’s degrees awarded in 2011 (Snyder and Dillow, 2013, 
p. 448). Women also earn higher grades in college than men (Adelman 1995; Kuh and 
Hu 1999; Spitzer 2000). The female advantage in college entry and completion holds 
across all income quartiles, across racial groups, and across all types of family structures 
& backgrounds (Bailey and Dynarski 2011; Buchmann and DiPrete 2006). The shrinking 
gaps between men and women in postsecondary enrollment and completion can largely 
be explained by the decline in discrimination between the sexes, the increasing returns to 
higher education for women, and advances in contraception that improved family 
planning (Goldin and Katz 2001; Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006; Hock 2007). The 
subsequent reversal of the gender gap is largely due to variations in enrollment patterns 
between the sexes (men are more likely to take time off or enroll part-time, both of which 
decrease the probability of degree completion) and the superior academic performance of 
females (Buchmann and DiPrete 2006; Ewert 2012).  
 
2.3.2 Race 
Veterans are more likely than nonveterans to be black. Since the beginning of the 
all-volunteer force in 1973, blacks have been overrepresented in the military and 
especially the Army (Segal, Thanner, & Segal 2007). In 2014, blacks made up 18.9 
percent of active duty enlisted service members but only 13.5 percent of the civilian labor 
force between the ages 18 and 44 (Office of the Under Secretary for Defense 2015). 
Hispanics are underrepresented in the military but they represent a growing segment, 
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especially in the Marine Corps (Segal, Thanner, & Segal 2007). This is probably at least 
partly due to the fact that citizenship was a prerequisite for enlistment until fairly 
recently. In 2014, Hispanics comprised 20 percent of the 18-44 civilian labor force in 
2014 but only 13.2 percent of active duty service members (Office of the Under Secretary 
for Defense 2015).  
These representation trends impact racial representation among student veterans. 
Radford and Wun (2009) report that among undergraduates in 2007-2008, blacks were 
overrepresented among military students (18.3% compared with 18.1% of financially-
independent civilians and 10.3% of financially-dependent civilians). Additionally, 
Hispanics were underrepresented among military students (12.8% compared with 15.1% 
of financially-independent civilians and 13.5% of financially-dependent civilians). 
However, they use data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), 
which only identifies military students who filed the Free Application for Federal Student 
Aid (FAFSA). This subset may not be representative for veterans, as filing the FAFSA is 
not necessary for using GI Bill benefits. Using data from the 2012 National Survey of 
Student Engagement (NSSE), Cole and Kim (2013) corroborate that blacks are 
overrepresented among military students in four-year institutions. They report that 10.6% 
of military students, but only 7.1% of civilian students, are black. However, they also 
report that Hispanics are slightly overrepresented as well; 7.8% of military students are 
Hispanic but only 6.8% of civilian students are (Cole and Kim 2013). 
The racial gaps in postsecondary enrollment are shrinking. Among new high 
school graduates in 1985, 57% of whites, but only 40% of blacks and 46% of Hispanics, 
enrolled in a 2- or 4-year college. In 2011, the college enrollment of new graduates had 
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risen to 69% for whites, 65% for blacks, 64% for Hispanics, and 85% for Asians (who 
weren’t tracked until 2003; Snyder and Dillow, 2013, p. 334). The racial gaps in 
graduation rates, however, have not closed in a similar manner. Out of full-time students 
who began a 4-year degree in 1996, 58% of whites but only 39% of blacks and 46% of 
Latinos finished within six years. For the cohort entering college in 2005, the 6-year 
graduation rate had improved slightly for whites (62%) and for Latinos (51%) but had 
barely changed for blacks (40%) (Snyder and Dillow, 2013, p. 527). The graduation rates 
look substantially different for full-time students at 2-year institutions: for the students 
that began in 2008, 30% of whites graduated within three years, compared with 27% of 
blacks, 35% of Latinos, and 34% of Asians. These proportions fluctuated very little over 
the previous eight years for all groups except Latinos, for whom the graduation rate 
improved by about 5 percentage points (Snyder and Dillow, 2013, p. 532).  
Studies that control for socioeconomic status and academic preparation (test 
scores and grades) show substantially smaller or non-existent effects of race on college 
enrollment and college graduation (Kao and Thompson, 2003; Adelman, 1999, 2006). 
Carnevale and Strohl (2013) argue that the racial gaps in postsecondary graduation are 
also due in part to differences in college choice between these groups, since blacks and 
Hispanics are less likely than whites to enroll at more selective institutions. In 2009, 25% 
of white freshmen enrolled at the most selective colleges in the country, while only 9% of 
blacks and 12% of Hispanics did. Instead, 72% of black freshmen and 74% of Hispanic 
freshmen (but only 53% of whites) started college at open-access institutions, which have 
worse graduation rates than selective schools, even for students with similar SAT scores 
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(Carnevale and Strohl, 2013, p. 51).2  Sibulkin and Butler (2005) show that black students 
are much more likely than white students to have a child while enrolled, which also 
substantially reduces the probability of graduating. 
 
2.3.3 Socioeconomic Status 
Military participation is also associated with socioeconomic status (SES). SES, or 
class, typically refers to the education and/or income level (which are highly correlated) 
for a person or household. Those from a lower socioeconomic status are more likely to 
enlist in the military instead of directly entering college or the workforce (Kleykamp 
2006). This, in turn, means that students with military service are also from a lower SES. 
Cole & Kim (2013) find that 61.8% of military students are first-generation students, 
while only 42.8% of civilian students are. 
Socioeconomic status is one of the strongest predictors of college student success. 
Individuals with parents who either are low-income or do not have a college degree are 
less likely to enroll in college, even when controlling for additional factors (Baker and 
Velez, 1996; Choy, 2001; Aronson, 2008). In 2011, 83% of recent high school graduates 
from the top family income quintile enrolled in college, in contrast to 54% of those in the 
lowest quintile (Snyder and Dillow, 2013, p. 335). Low SES students who do enroll are 
less likely than other students to finish degrees (Choy, 2001; Warburton, Bugarin, and 
Nuñez, 2001; Aronson, 2008). Among students who graduated high school in 1992 and 
had enrolled in college before 2000, 43% of the first-generation college students had left 
                                                        
2 The authors argue that open-access schools have poorer outcomes not because of 
selection, but because they spend significantly less on instruction per student. 
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without a degree but only 20% of students with a parent who had at least a bachelor’s 
degree had done so (Chen, 2005). Low SES students typically receive less support from 
their families, both in terms of financial assistance and advice surrounding college 
decisions. They are also more likely to attend high schools that have fewer financial 
resources and have substandard college advising capacity (Wells and Lynch, 2012). 
Socioeconomically disadvantaged students are less likely to take rigorous courses in high 
school and are older, get lower grades, work more hours while enrolled, attend less 
selective institutions, are more likely to attend part-time, and are more likely to have 
discontinuous enrollment across multiple institutions—all of which reduce the odds of 
retention and graduation (Warburton, Bugarin, and Nuñez, 2001; Aronson, 2008; 
Goldrick-Rab, 2006). 
 
2.3.4 Academic Preparation 
Those who enlist in the military are less academically prepared for college. 
Having lower high school grades is associated with choosing military enlistment over 
entering college directly (Elder et al., 2010). However, it is uncertain whether those 
veterans who eventually enroll in college are less academically prepared than 
nonveterans who attend college. 
Academic preparation is one of the strongest predictors of postsecondary student 
success. This includes any pre-collegiate indicators that illustrate academic readiness for 
college-level work. These measures include high school GPA, class rank, standardized 
test scores, and rigor of high school curriculum. Adelman (2006) finds that the intensity 
and quality of one’s high school curriculum are the strongest pre-enrollment factor 
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related to bachelor’s degree completion, but finds all of them to be significant and highly 
correlated with each other.  
 
2.3.5 Nontraditional Student Attributes 
Veterans are also more likely to be nontraditional college students. The 
nontraditional classification has varying definitions, but usually designates any student 
who does not begin postsecondary education directly after high school. Typically, seven 
characteristics define nontraditional students: delayed postsecondary enrollment, part-
time attendance, financial independence, full-time employment while enrolled, the 
presence of dependents, single parenthood, or a non-standard high school diploma (Horn 
and Carroll 1996). Enrolled veterans exhibit many of these nontraditional student 
characteristics. Student veterans are more likely than nonveteran students to delay 
enrollment (due to military service, primarily), be financially independent, have 
dependents, work off-campus, and attend part time (Radford and Wun 2009, Radford 
2011, Cole & Kim 2013).   
Although estimates from other scholars may vary with their definitions of 
“nontraditional,” Horn and Carroll (1996) estimate that 54% of all undergraduates in 
1992 are nontraditional in at least one of these seven factors and Choy (2002) estimates 
that the proportion is 73% nearly a decade later. Nontraditional students fare far worse 
than their traditional peers in terms of first year retention rates and overall graduation 
rates (Horn and Carroll 1996; Choy 2002; Taniguchi and Kaufman 2005). Among 
students attempting to earn a bachelor’s degree, 54% of traditional students but only 31% 
of nontraditional students had done so within five years (Horn and Carroll, 1996).  
  20 
Four attributes of nontraditional students linked to student veterans warrant 
additional discussion. 
 
2.3.5.1 Delayed Entry 
Many see delayed entry into college as the primary characteristic of a 
nontraditional student, though some interchange this with being an older student (because 
students who delay entry into postsecondary education are, by necessity, older than 
students who enroll directly after high school). Although some studies report that older 
students earn slightly better grades (Leppel 1984; Spitzer 2000), students who wait to 
enter college generally fare worse than those who do not. Among students who began 
college in 1995, about one third had waited at least a year after high school graduation to 
enroll. Six years later, 58% of immediate entrants had earned some sort of degree but 
only 40% of delayed entrants had (Horn, Cataldi, and Sikora, 2005). When controlling 
for related factors, Bozick and DeLuca (2006) estimate that students who delay entry into 
college for a year are 64% less likely to finish a bachelor’s degree than those who enroll 
immediately after high school. Students who wait to enroll in college tend to be from 
lower SES families (Horn, Cataldi, and Sikora, 2005; Bozick and DeLuca, 2006; 
Goldrick-Rab and Han, 2011) and are almost six times as likely to be from the bottom 
family income quintile as from the top (Goldrick-Rab and Han, 2011). SES, however, 
doesn’t fully explain the differential outcomes related to enrollment delays. Recent 
research suggests that part of the explanation is that students who delay entry are also 
more likely to be married or partnered, more likely to have children, and more likely to 
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work more than 35 hours per week, all of which decrease the odds of finishing a degree 
(Roksa and Velez, 2012; Goldrick-Rab and Han, 2011). 
 
2.3.5.2 Enrollment Status 
Part-time enrollment is surprisingly common. Among those entering 4-year 
colleges in 1995, 53% of students enrolled part-time (i.e., fewer than 12 credit hours) for 
at least one semester during college (Adelman, 2006). Variation in enrollment patterns 
accounts for the largest share of the gap between traditional and nontraditional students in 
persistence and completion (Taniguchi and Kaufman, 2005; Horn and Carroll, 1996). The 
negative relationship between part-time status and student success consistently appears in 
other research as well (Carroll, 1989; O’Toole, Stratton, and Wetzel, 2003; Adelman, 
2006). It’s unclear why this is the case, though some theorize that these students are less 
academically and socially integrated3 (Taniguchi and Kaufman, 2005). Adelman (2006, 
p. 79) finds that enrolling part-time at any point in one’s college career decreases the 
probability of attaining a bachelor’s degree within 6 years by 25 percent. 
 
2.3.5.3 Employment 
The relationship between employment during college and student success is 
generally negative, although this varies depending on how much one works. About 80% 
of undergraduates report working at some point during their college career (Roksa and 
Velez, 2012). Working part-time at a lower intensity (15 hours per week or fewer) has a 
                                                        
3 Student integration refers to the level of involvement and embeddedness a student 
experiences on campus. I discuss student integration later in this section. 
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positive effect on retention and GPA, but working full-time (35 hours per week or more) 
has a negative effect on both. The relationship is stronger for retention than for grades, 
and the benefits of light employment are stronger for on-campus jobs (Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 2005; Riggert et al., 2006; Roksa and Velez, 2012).  
 
2.3.5.4 Dependents 
A number of studies have shown that students with dependents are less likely to 
finish college (Adelman 1999, 2006; Bozick & DeLuca, 2005; Goldrick-Rab and Han, 
2011). Roksa and Velez (2012) estimate that being married or cohabitating reduces the 
odds of degree completion by nearly 40% and that becoming a parent reduces the odds by 
50%. There is some dissent on this point in older research, though. Grosset (1991) finds 
that having dependents is positively associated with short-term persistence. Additionally, 
Astin (1975) finds that the presence of children increases the probability of degree 
completion for men, but reduces it for women. Taniguchi and Kaufman (2005) find no 
difference in the probability of degree completion between married students and those 
who have never married, although they find that divorced students are less likely to 
finish. 
 
2.3.6 Funding 
Veterans are entitled to substantial postsecondary education after military service. 
Although the original GI Bill for World War II veterans covered tuition and living 
expenses, the subsequent versions during the Vietnam period and the early all-volunteer 
force period were less comprehensive and required veterans to make initial contributions 
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to receive benefits later. The Post-9/11 GI Bill, passed in 2008, is the most recent 
legislative update to the postsecondary education benefits for veterans. It is similar to the 
original GI Bill in its high availability and levels of benefits. Veterans serving on active 
duty for at least 90 days after September 10th, 2001, are eligible for benefits, although to 
receive the maximum amount individuals must have served for at least 36 months (or 
have been discharged earlier due to a service-related disability). The benefits package 
includes a payment for tuition and fees (up to the cost of the most expensive in-state 
public school), a housing allowance (equivalent to the housing payment awarded to 
military personnel at the E-5 rank with dependents living in the institution’s zip code, 
with exceptions for those enrolled in distance learning programs or in foreign schools), 
and a stipend for textbooks and supplies (up to $1,000 per year). I estimate that a veteran 
who qualifies for the full award amount and attends GSU would receive $14,448 for the 
fall 2017 semester. Veterans who need additional funds because they attend out-of-state 
or private schools may receive supplementary tuition assistance through the Yellow 
Ribbon Program, an additional program through the VA. The Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits 
can be used for apprenticeships, on-the-job training, flight school, or degrees and 
certificates at traditional colleges, universities, and trade schools. Veterans can transfer 
these benefits to spouses and dependents, although this generally requires a commitment 
to four additional years of service beyond the initial 36 months (Department of Veterans 
Affairs 2012). 
Scholars working on the postsecondary educational attainment of veterans have 
been most interested in evaluating the causal impact of the initial GI Bill and its 
legislative kin. Impact estimates conclude that the provision of these education benefits 
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has had a positive effect on the education level of US veterans serving in World War II 
(Bound & Turner 2002; Stanley 2003), Korea (Stanley 2003), and Vietnam (Mattila 
1978), although Nam (1964) provides a dissenting opinion on the WWII era. These 
positive effects have not accrued equitably, however, with the WWII GI Bill package 
only improving educational attainment for white men and black men born outside the 
South (Turner and Bound 2003). Lemieux and Card (2001) also found evidence for 
positive impacts of the Canadian equivalent of the GI Bill, although they did not address 
distributional aspects. Zhang (forthcoming) finds that the Post-9/11 GI Bill increased the 
enrollment of veterans in postsecondary education, but the effect was largest just after 
implementation. 
A large body of research contains mixed conclusions on the relationship between 
financial aid and college success. Since many unobservable traits are correlated with both 
financial aid levels and student success, conclusions from past research have been weakly 
supported and occasionally contradictory. For the most part, the literature suggests that 
financial aid has a small positive effect on retention and graduation, with the largest 
effects coming from higher aid levels or from aid focused on the poorest students (see 
Hossler et al., 2009, for an extensive overview, but also St. John, 2004; Singell, 2004; 
Pascarella and Terenzini, 2005; Long, 2008). Most of the conflicting findings center on 
merit aid programs that are awarded based on high school performance and require 
maintaining a college GPA above a specified threshold. Merit aid programs may not 
improve degree completion because the college GPA requirement incentivizes lighter 
course loads, because many students lose merit-based aid early in their college career, or 
because many recipients are high-quality students who would have graduated even 
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without the merit aid (see Sjoquist and Winters 2014). Despite these debates on the 
causal impact of aid, researchers typically agree that as unmet financial need increases, 
the odds of persisting and graduating decrease (Pascarella and Terenzini, 2005).  
 
2.3.7 Disabilities 
Veterans may also perform differently in higher education because they are more 
likely than nonveterans to have physical and mental injuries that can impede success in 
the classroom. Veterans, especially those exposed to combat, are at increased risk of 
injury. According to the Department of Defense (2015), 52,313 have been wounded in 
action in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq before August 2010), Operation Enduring 
Freedom (Afghanistan), and Operation New Dawn (Iraq after August 2010). This is about 
2% of the approximately 2.5 million who have served in these conflicts (Baker, 2014). 
However, these statistics exclude wounds inflicted during non-combat situations (heat 
exhaustion, assault, suicide attempts, etc.) and, usually, “invisible” wounds that affect the 
brain and the mind. Traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) are widespread among those who 
have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, due in part to the prevalence of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) in these conflicts. TBIs include brain damage ranging from 
mild concussions to major head trauma, and can result in problems with memory, 
planning, attention, and problem solving (Okie, 2005; Baker, 2014). Researchers estimate 
between 6% and 19% of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans suffered a TBI (Taylor et al., 
2012; Hoge et al., 2008; Tanielian et al., 2008).  
Veterans are at a higher risk for such mental health problems as posttraumatic 
stress disorder, depression, alcohol abuse, and other related mental health issues. Based 
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on the requisite post-deployment screenings by the Department of Defense, Hoge, 
Auchterlonie, and Milliken (2006) estimate that 19.1% of Iraq veterans and 11.3% of 
Afghanistan veterans returned with at least one of these mental health problems. 
However, subsequent research on Iraq veterans suggests that these earlier estimates 
actually understate the prevalence due to the proximity of the screening to the end of 
service (Milliken, Auchterlonie, and Hoge, 2007). Most research has focused on PTSD, 
with researchers estimating prevalence rates between 8% and 25% for veterans of Iraq 
and Afghanistan, with higher rates among the Iraq veterans and those who served in the 
National Guard or Reserves (Hoge et al., 2004; Vasterling et al., 2006; Hoge, 
Auchterlonie, and Milliken, 2006; Hoge et al., 2007; Seal et al., 2007; Erbes et al., 2007; 
Schell and Marshall, 2008; Smith et al., 2008).  
Research examining the prevalence of injuries among students who have served is 
less extensive. Active duty and veteran students have higher rates of psychological 
symptoms than their civilian peers (Barry, Whiteman, and Wadsworth, 2014), with one 
survey reporting that 46% of the veteran students surveyed experienced significant 
symptoms of PTSD (Rudd, Goulding, and Bryan, 2011). In interviews, student veterans 
also report having attendance and attention issues due to combat-related physical pain 
(DiRamio, Ackerman, and Mitchell, 2008; Ackerman, DiRamio, and Garza Mitchell, 
2009). 
Disabilities can inhibit students from succeeding in college. Physical disabilities 
may render it difficult for a student to get to classes, to write notes or assignments, and, if 
in pain, to fully pay attention when present. Mental disabilities can impede a student’s 
comprehension, attention, motivation, and communication. Students with disabilities 
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comprise a fairly small proportion of postsecondary students—about 11% of all 
postsecondary students in 2008 (Government Accountability Office, 2009). Disabled 
students report lower postsecondary GPAs than their non-disabled peers (Wagner et al. 
1991). These disabled students were less likely to persist in or complete postsecondary 
programs than students without disabilities (Hurst and Smerdon, 2000; Murray et al., 
2000; Quick, Lehmann, & Deniston 2003; Mamiseishvili & Koch, 2012). Horn, Berktold, 
and Bobbit (1999) estimate that only 53% of disabled students were still enrolled or had 
graduated within five years, in contrast to 64% of students without disabilities.  
 
2.3.8 Student Integration 
Some research suggests that military students are less academically and socially 
integrated than their civilian peers. Integration entails having positive interactions with 
faculty and peers, making friends, and getting involved with student organizations. 
Military students report feeling less supported on campus and being less engaged in 
college life than nonmilitary students, although the nonmilitary students over 25 reported 
about the same levels of support and engagement as the military students (Cole and Kim 
2013). 
Student integration (both academic and social) is positively associated with 
persistence (Astin 1993; Tinto, 1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 2005; Kuh et al., 2008). 
Social integration improves the chances of finishing college because it fosters a support 
system for the individual (Tinto, 1993).  
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2.4 Additional Factors Associated with  
Postsecondary Student Success 
Some additional factors are strong predictors of postsecondary student success. 
These warrant brief discussions even though there is no evidence to suggest that these 
factors are also associated with veteran status.  
 
2.4.1 Continuous enrollment  
A student is continuously enrolled if he or she reenrolls for each non-summer 
term until leaving the institution permanently. This makes a distinction between 
“stopping out” (i.e., after beginning college, taking at least a semester off before 
returning to college) and dropping out (i.e., after beginning college, leaving school 
permanently without a degree). Aside from academic background, continuous enrollment 
is the variable with the strongest association with degree completion (Adelman, 1999, 
2006). Continuous enrollment increases the probability of finishing a bachelor’s degree 
by 43 percent (Adelman, 2006). 
 
2.4.2 College GPA  
Although college GPA is an outcome measure of student success, it is also a 
contributor to retention and graduation. College grades signal that the student is an 
appropriate academic fit for the institution, but grades also reflect student effort. Grades 
are strongly associated with degree persistence, both when measured as first year GPA 
and overall GPA trend (Adelman, 1999, 2006). 
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2.4.3 Withdrawal percentage 
The number of course withdrawals and repeats is another strong predictor of 
degree completion (Adelman, 1999, 2006). This can indicate academic unpreparedness, 
but it also prolongs the collegiate time frame and depletes financial resources. Adelman 
(2006) estimates that having course withdrawals and repeats that exceed 20% of 
attempted credits reduces the probability of graduating by 49%. 
 
2.5 Prior Research on Postsecondary Student Success Measures  
for Veteran Students 
Early attempts to assess postsecondary outcomes while controlling for additional 
variables generally suggest that veteran students fare at least as well as comparable, 
nonveteran peers. These researchers focus on college grades, probably because they 
allow for simpler comparisons over shorter time periods. Love and Hutchison (1946) 
matched a small number of veterans and nonveterans (n=208) at a single university on 
academic college (e.g., business, arts & sciences) and standardized test scores, finding a 
slight (but non-significant) grade advantage for the veteran students. Garmezy and Crose 
(1948) matched a larger number (n=809) of veterans and nonveterans on additional 
attributes (sex, age, race, marital status, in addition to college and college aptitude), also 
finding a slight, but non-significant, GPA advantage for the veteran students. Gowan 
(1949) examined 511 freshmen at Iowa State College, finding a clear advantage in first-
year GPA for veteran students after controlling for high school GPA and standardized 
test scores. Frederiksen and Schrader (1951) utilized an ANCOVA procedure to control 
for college readiness, finding that veterans received slightly higher grades than 
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nonveterans of equal ability. However, this significant difference was relatively small 
(approximately the difference between a C and a C+) and was only statistically 
significant at some of the individual institutions in the sample (Frederiksen and Schrader 
1951). Joanning (1975) corroborated an overall positive grade differential for veteran 
students, but noted that only the subset of veteran students with pre-service college 
experience outperformed the nonveteran students, with the other veteran students 
performing about the same as the nonveterans. McGregor, Reece, and Garner (1997) 
show that among community college students in 1996, veterans earned higher grades and 
were less likely to withdraw from courses than nonveterans. 
Among all adults in the US, veterans have a lower average educational attainment 
than nonveterans. This gap has decreased somewhat over time for Vietnam-era veterans 
(Teachman 2005) but not for veterans of the subsequent all-volunteer force (Teachman 
2007). Teachman (2007) speculates that this is due to the rise of alternate pathways to 
college, as they allow those who would have enlisted for college benefits to pursue 
college directly without service. 
Over the past decade, the general public and the research community have 
focused more attention on the postsecondary outcome measures for those veterans who 
actually pursue higher education. Recent media reports have claimed that 88% of 
veterans drop out within their first year of postsecondary education and only 3% 
eventually finish (e.g., Betar 2012, Briggs 2012, Wood 2012). Researchers and veteran 
groups have widely criticized these estimates, however. I could not find the primary 
  31 
source(s) that inspired these articles,4 but Cate (2014b) claims that the research used early 
education benefit termination as a proxy for dropping out (an operationalization that 
artificially inflated the dropout rate). 
Self-reported data suggests that veterans could be completing education programs 
at higher rates than nonveterans. The Department of Veterans Affairs irregularly conducts 
nationwide surveys of veterans covering a wide range of issues. The most recent survey 
(in 2010) asks about education benefits usage and outcomes. Of those who had used 
education benefits, 66.6% reported finishing the program for which they were used 
(Westat 2010, 147). When analyzing the survey by service era, Cate (2014a) finds that 
veterans serving in World War II and the following years report the highest completion 
rates (80%), followed by veterans serving in the Korean conflict (73%). Completion rates 
were slightly lower but stable for veterans serving from the end of the Korean conflict 
until August 2001 (68%). Only 51% of veterans serving after 9/11 reported finishing the 
program funded by their education benefits, but it is likely that many of these students 
entered after the implementation of the Post-9/11 GI Bill in 2009 and are still enrolled. 
An analysis in Ohio found mixed results for veteran student success at public 
institutions in the state (Ohio Board of Regents 2014). Veterans had higher graduation 
rates in Ohio community colleges (33.8% of veterans graduated, compared with 24.3% 
for the total cohort of students), but lower graduation rates in universities (51.7% of 
veterans finished while 60.0% of all students finished). In both community colleges and 
                                                        
4 Although most of these articles refer to reports from the University of Colorado Denver, 
the Colorado Workforce Development Council, and/or the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Health, Education and Labor and Pensions, no direct citations were provided and the 
primary source(s) could not be located as of the time of writing. 
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universities, the veterans had higher completion rates than minorities, those entering at 
age 22 or older, and those deemed academically unprepared (Ohio Board of Regents, 
2014). The authors acknowledge significant data quality and sampling issues in the 
analysis. Practices for identification and data collection for veterans varied across 
institutions. Additionally, the Veterans’ Services Office identified those student veterans 
who had sought out services, which could be an unrepresentative sample of student 
veterans. The veterans identified made up less than 1% of students.  
The contemporary, large-scale empirical research is limited to two major 
endeavors spearheaded by the Student Veterans of America: the Million Records Project 
(MRP) and the National Veteran Education Success Tracker (NVEST). The Student 
Veterans of America, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the National Student 
Clearinghouse collaborated to analyze postsecondary success outcomes for veteran 
students. The Department of Veterans Affairs identified student veterans who had utilized 
GI Bill benefits and released their information to the National Student Clearinghouse. 
The National Student Clearinghouse matched the educational records of these student 
veterans to the data supplied by the Department of Veterans Affairs, then stripped the 
data of personal identifiers. The de-identified individual-level records for the student 
veterans were then shipped to the Student Veterans of America for analysis. 
The MRP study sample included 898,895 veterans who utilized either 
Montgomery GI Bill or Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits (or both) between 2002 and 2010 to 
earn a postsecondary degree or certificate. The sample excludes students who used other 
veterans’ education benefits besides the GI Bills (such as the Tuition Assistance program 
from the Department of Defense) and also students utilizing transferred GI Bill benefits 
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(such as spouses and children of veterans). Student veterans in the sample were enrolled 
at either 2- or 4-year institutions in the public, nonprofit, and for-profit levels. The 
sample is not representative across institutional sectors, as veterans at for-profit 
institutions are under-represented. This is due, in part, to the fact that the National 
Student Clearinghouse receives data from a smaller proportion of for-profit institutions 
(68% as of 2013, compared with 99% of public institutions and 93% of nonprofit 
institutions for the same year). As a result, the aggregate estimate of degree completion 
for veteran students by Cate is likely biased upward. In the sample, 79% of the student 
veterans initially enrolled in public institutions, with 11% at nonprofit institutions and 
10% at for-profit institutions (Cate 2014b, p31).  
To examine postsecondary completion rates in the MRP, the authors exclude 
students with an initial postsecondary enrollment date of 2011 or later. This drops about 
8% of their initial sample, leaving 788,915 cases. In the reduced sample, 51.7% of 
student veterans achieved a postsecondary degree or certificate. Interestingly, 40.8% of 
those who completed a postsecondary degree or certificate had already earned at least one 
credential before utilizing GI Bill benefits. This could indicate degree attainment before 
enlistment, degree attainment during service (or directly after) through Prior Learning 
Assessment credits, or strategic use of benefits after service (e.g., using DOD tuition 
assistance for an associate’s degree and saving GI Bill benefits for a bachelor’s degree). 
Out of those who completed associates and bachelor’s degrees, the average times to 
completion were 5.1 years and 6.3 years, respectively. 
The NVEST project is similar in methodology to the MRP, but exclusively looks 
at the success of student veterans that use the Post-9/11 GI Bill. The sample includes 
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822,327 student veterans who used the Post-9/11 GI Bill between August 2009 and 
December 2013 and had records in the National Student Clearinghouse. The education 
records extended until September 2015. Among these student veterans who used the 
Post-9/11 GI Bill, 53.6% completed a postsecondary education program and 18% were 
still enrolled in 2015. Again, this excludes any student veterans who were enrolled during 
the time frame but did not use the Post-9/11 GI Bill and any student veterans who did use 
it at non-reporting postsecondary institutions or for on-the-job training (Cate, Lyon, 
Schmeling, and Bogue, 2017). 
The research projects from the Student Veterans of America are the first real 
attempts to understand the postsecondary outcomes of modern student veterans. 
However, the studies suffer from some major limitations that limit their utility. The most 
significant issue is that the study samples include only veterans. The lack of a suitable 
comparison group within each study prevents us from drawing reliable conclusions 
across groups of interest (such as whether veterans finish degrees at the same rates as 
nonveterans enrolled in similar places). Both projects also aggregate student veterans in 
all degree levels when calculating completion rates. Although the author of the MRP 
report does note that varying approaches prevent direct comparisons with completion 
statistics from other research, he later goes on to do just this: "In fact, student veterans are 
attaining degrees at a rate similar to that of all students—traditional and non-traditional" 
(Cate 2014b, p.53). The NVEST report emphasizes this idea even more, noting in the 
executive summary that student veterans using the Post-9/11 GI Bill “perform better than 
their peers” and “are more likely to graduate” (Cate et al. 2017, p.viii). 
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2.6 Prior Research on Veteran Success in Related Areas 
Related research on labor market outcomes for veterans and nonveterans is useful 
here. Angrist and Kreuger (1994) initially find an apparent wage premium for WWII 
veterans over nonveterans, but after using an instrument to correct for selection bias the 
authors find that these veterans earn no more than (and probably less than) comparable 
nonveterans. Kleykamp (2013) finds a small wage premium for post-9/11 veterans but 
only for those with a high school education or lower. Additionally, Kleykamp reports that 
the common bivariate statistics on unemployment for post-9/11 veterans significantly 
understate the labor market penalty these veterans pay compared to statistically similar 
nonveterans, in part because veterans are more likely to be male and less likely to be high 
school dropouts. This line of research illustrates how factors associated with military 
service can distort relationships between veteran status and labor market outcomes, but it 
also suggests that veterans perform worse (at least in terms of employment and wages) 
than nonveterans who otherwise hold the same characteristics on other relevant traits. 
However, Kleykamp (2013) does find that post-9/11 veterans are more likely than 
comparable nonveterans to enroll in college. 
The evidence on veterans employed in the public sector is scarce and mixed. In 
the federal workforce, Lewis (2013) finds that veterans advance more slowly than 
nonveterans hired into the same grades. However, Johnson (2015) finds that those 
receiving veterans’ preference advance at least as quickly as nonveterans after controlling 
for job and worker characteristics. 
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2.7 The Student Veteran Paradox 
Veterans have many attributes that have been shown to hinder student success. 
Moreover, the evidence from research on labor market outcomes for veterans suggests 
that veterans should perform worse in college as well. On the whole, theory and related 
evidence suggest that veteran students should perform worse than nonveteran students. 
However, past research indicates this is not the case. Despite the limitations in scope and 
rigor, the prior research on student veterans has been fairly consistent: veterans perform 
at least as well as, if not better than, their nonveteran peers. Consistent findings that 
student veterans have outcomes that are equivalent to or better than nonveterans are very 
surprising. 
This presents a logical paradox.5 Theory and related evidence from labor market 
outcomes suggest that veteran students are less likely than nonveterans to succeed in 
college, yet this contradicts the evidence that student veterans are at least as likely to 
succeed. This is logically inconsistent and both cannot be true. Thus, the student veteran 
paradox can be summarized as follows: veteran students should be less likely to succeed 
than nonveteran students; but veteran students are not less likely to succeed and may, in 
fact, be more likely to succeed.6 
 
  
                                                        
5 In the most common type of logical paradox, sound reasoning produces a conclusion 
that is contradictory or nonsensical. 
6 The Million Records Project report also contains a discussion of a paradox regarding 
veteran students (Cate 2014b) but the usage is slightly different here. 
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2.8 The Competing Explanations and Hypotheses 
The rest of this study attempts to explain the student veteran paradox. I examine 
veteran student success within a competing hypothesis framework to understand the 
apparent advantage that veteran students exhibit in postsecondary outcomes. I propose 
seven ways to resolve the student veteran paradox and make sense out of the veteran 
advantage seen in past research. These explanations are exhaustive but not mutually 
exclusive. The observed veteran advantage could be due to: 1) bias introduced through 
data and methodology limitations; 2) differences in observable background 
characteristics between veterans and nonveterans; 3) differences in enrollment behaviors 
between veterans and nonveterans; 4) maturity gains from entering college at a slightly 
older age; 5) education funding benefits from the GI Bill and related programs; 6) 
unobservable factors associated with selection into the military; or 7) the direct effects of 
military service. These seven explanations for resolving the student veteran paradox yield 
a set of testable research hypotheses. I discuss each explanation and related hypotheses in 
greater detail.  
 
2.8.1 Explanation 1: Bias 
The past research on outcomes for veterans in higher education has been limited 
in both scope and rigor. Most revolves around evaluating the impact of the GI Bill on the 
stock of educated veterans. Other researchers have examined how the college experiences 
for veteran and nonveteran students differ. More direct attempts to analyze the 
postsecondary success of veteran students have either focused on outcomes in the very 
short run (like semester grades) or been hindered by significant limitations in the data 
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available. The earlier research is likely inapplicable to more recent veterans since the 
transition to an all-volunteer force. The most recent attempts of this sort argue that the 
college completion rates of veteran students are comparable to nonveteran students, yet 
these conclusions have been drawn from studies that only analyze data on veterans. 
Without an appropriate comparison group of nonveteran students in the same study, the 
researchers risk biased results and unsubstantiated conclusions.  
The bias explanation suggests that the veteran paradox doesn’t exist and has been 
a product of substantial limitations in past research. If the bias explanation is true, then 
when examining student success with an appropriate dataset and comparison group either 
veterans will not hold characteristics that hinder student success or veterans will no 
longer be at least as successful as nonveterans on the outcome measures: 
H1a: Veterans do not hold characteristics that inhibit student success 
H1b: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans 
 
2.8.2 Explanation 2: Background Characteristics 
If veteran and nonveteran students differ on background characteristics that 
predict student success, then these differences could explain varying student success 
outcomes between veterans and nonveterans. These background characteristics include 
sex, race, socioeconomic status, and academic background. Although theory and past 
research predict that veterans should hold characteristics on these variables that make 
them less successful students, it is important to test these predictions nonetheless. 
Sometimes relationships are only partially understood by researchers and occasionally 
relationships change directions in multivariate settings.  
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Though unlikely, the group differences explanation suggests that background 
characteristics explain the veteran advantage: 
H2: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
after controlling for background characteristics 
 
2.8.3 Explanation 3: Enrollment Patterns 
Differing patterns related to college enrollment could explain differing student 
success outcomes. These enrollment patterns include levels of basic funding (grants, 
loans, and scholarships), part-time status, and hours of transfer credit. Again, these 
factors seem unlikely to explain the veteran paradox since past research has shown that 
veterans are more likely to enroll part-time and have similar levels of overall funding 
(Radford and Wun, 2009; Radford, 2011). Still, these differences in enrollment behaviors 
might play out in unexpected ways that are not predicted by theory.  
If this explanation is true, then enrollment behaviors will explain the veteran 
advantage: 
H3: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
after controlling for enrollment pattern variables 
 
2.8.4 Explanation 4: Maturation 
The veteran advantage could also be due to simple maturation. Used here, 
maturation refers to gains in maturity that are a result of getting older.7 Those who enter 
                                                        
7 This kind of maturation does not include maturity gains that could be a result of military 
service. 
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college after serving in the military are necessarily older than their traditional student 
peers who enter directly from high school. Past research has shown that delayed entry, on 
the whole, is negatively associated with postsecondary success (Horn, Cataldi, and Sikora 
2005; Bozick and DeLuca 2006), but this relationship might be curvilinear, with shorter 
delays in entry being a boon to student success while longer delays hinder it. At least for 
some kinds of students, a short delay (a few years or less, perhaps) could be 
advantageous, as it can allow for extra time for growth and maturity. This is the driving 
idea behind the practice of taking a “gap year” between high school and college (Jones 
2004). However, I could find no research on how these short, intentional delays impact 
education outcomes. Longer delays (perhaps at least 5-10 years) likely hinder student 
success because older students are more likely to have dependents and full-time jobs. 
Additionally, students who enter at a substantially older age may also face technological, 
pedagogical, and/or discriminatory barriers, simply because they have been out of the 
educational system for so long. If the negative effect of long-term delays in college entry 
is very large, this could mask any positive effects that short-term delays may have. Since 
about half of student veterans are between twenty and thirty (Cate 2014b; Radford and 
Wun 2009), I propose that the veteran advantage could be attributable to the gains in 
maturity that accompany short-term (but not long-term) delays in college entry. 
If the maturation explanation is true, then age will explain the veteran advantage:  
H4: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
after controlling for age 
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2.8.5 Explanation 5: Funding 
The veteran advantage could be due to the education funding benefits that 
veterans receive. Although some research suggests that on average veteran students 
receive the same amount of financial assistance as nonveteran students (Radford and 
Wun, 2009), the aid that veteran students receive is substantially different in nature. 
While most large-scale programs award student aid on the basis of either need or 
academic merit, military education benefits are awarded on the basis of service. Aside 
from being fundamentally different in nature, military funding generally comes free from 
academic requirements in order to maintain continued funding (e.g., making satisfactory 
academic progress for federal aid, or maintaining a high GPA in the case of Georgia’s 
HOPE Scholarship). Although such requirements may incentivize students with 
traditional sources of student aid to perform well academically, these requirements also 
mean that funding could potentially be cut off midstream. Such disruptions in aid can 
cause academic progress to stall even if the student is still in good standing with respect 
to institutional requirements. Even aside from these possibilities, the education benefits 
for military students are generous and could increase the likelihood of student success 
and contribute to the veteran advantage. 
The funding explanation suggests that aid explains the relationship between 
veteran status and success outcomes. Since aid could be associated with other relevant 
factors, I expect a higher “dosage” of veteran funding will have a greater impact:  
H5: Students with higher levels of veteran education benefits tend to have  
better student success outcomes than otherwise similar students 
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2.8.6 Explanation 6: Selection 
Unobservable characteristics associated with enlistment could also explain 
differences in student success. As these factors are unobserved here, prior literature must 
be supplemented with a degree of speculation. Past research has shown that enlistment is 
associated with social isolation, alternative youth family structures (i.e., living with 
single-, step-, or foster-parents), and histories of adolescent fighting (Elder et al., 2010; 
Spence, Henderson, and Elder, 2013; Teachman and Tedrow, 2014). Additionally, those 
who enlist could be more impulsive since it’s easier to enter the military than college. 
Moreover, immaturity could be associated with signing up if the enlisted are delaying life 
decisions concerning education and career. I could find no research to support these latter 
correlations and, if true, it is uncertain how veteran students would compare to civilian 
students on these dimensions at the time of college entry. It seems that these factors 
would reduce student success. On the other hand, unobserved characteristics might also 
improve student success. Those who sign up for the military may be more mature than 
others, as evidenced by their willingness to risk personal safety to serve the country. 
Additionally, they could be more willing to delay short-term gratification in pursuit of 
long-term goals. At least for those who aren’t pursuing a military career, enlistment 
necessarily puts personal and professional matters on hold during service (although this is 
less true for those in the National Guard or reserves). Moreover, if the veterans who 
eventually go to college enlisted with the intent of using the subsequent education 
benefits, they might be actually better at planning and execution functions that could be a 
boon in the classroom. Kleykamp (2006) finds that college aspirations are associated with 
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enlisting (over entering the labor market or remaining unemployed), but no research 
supports superior planning capacities among those who enlist.  
The selection explanation suggests that unobserved factors help veterans succeed 
in college. On the whole this explanation seems less plausible, but if it is true then the 
veteran advantage will disappear when attempts to include these unobservable factors are 
used: 
H6: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
who match characteristics associated with enlistment 
 
2.8.7 Explanation 7: Direct Effects 
The veteran advantage could be due to the direct effects of military service. 
Proponents have long argued that military service builds character. A majority of 
veterans report that military service helped them develop independence, self-discipline, 
and the ability to cope with adversity, and those with more combat experience reported 
greater gains on the latter two (Elder and Clipp 1989). Self-discipline probably stems 
from habit-building and repeated challenges during training. Self-discipline likely also 
plays into one’s ability to cope with adversity, as self-control is one component of 
resilience (Meredith et al. 2011). Although physical training and combat experiences may 
naturally improve the ability to cope with adversity, this outcome could also be the 
product of resilience training programs during service. These programs were introduced 
to prevent readjustment problems and use evidence-based practices from positive 
psychology to build resilience. Several have been introduced, but the Army’s 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program has received the most focus (Bowles and Bates 
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2010, Casey 2011, Adler 2009). Grit is a related non-cognitive trait that might be 
associated with military participation. Duckworth and colleagues (2007) define grit as 
“perseverance and passion for long-term goals” and find it to be a strong predictor of 
overall educational attainment among adults and first-year GPA among students in elite 
universities. Although the effects of the military on grit have not been directly examined, 
grit has been associated with whether cadets complete the first year of training at military 
academies and whether soldiers complete the Army Special Operations Forces selection 
course (Duckworth et al. 2007, Maddi et al. 2012, Eskreis-Winkler et al. 2014). Military 
service could improve performance under pressure since soldiers are required to act under 
high-stress situations (especially during combat). However, to my knowledge this has not 
yet been examined.  
The direct effects explanation suggests that something about military service 
makes veterans better students. If the direct effects explanation is true, then veteran status 
will have a positive effect on student success even after controlling for the variables 
related to the above explanations:  
H7: Veterans have student success outcomes at least as good as nonveterans  
after controlling for all the aforementioned factors 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
Researchers have shown that many factors drive performance on student success 
outcomes and that veterans and nonveterans vary substantially with respect to these 
factors. This, coupled with research on veteran success in the labor market, suggests that 
student veterans should be less successful than nonveterans. Yet, the limited research 
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assessing student success outcomes for veteran and nonveteran students indicates that 
veterans are at least as successful as nonveterans. This is the student veteran paradox: 
veterans should be less likely to succeed than nonveterans, but veterans are as likely to 
succeed and may even be more likely to succeed. I propose seven possible explanations 
that could resolve the paradox. Each explanation leads to testable research hypotheses. 
The next chapter details methodological approaches to testing these hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 3  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Theory and related evidence predict that veteran students should be less 
successful than their nonveteran peers, yet the limited past research suggests that they are 
actually as successful as, if not more successful than, nonveterans. This is the student 
veteran paradox. I posit seven potential explanations to resolve this paradox: bias in past 
research, background characteristics of veterans, enrollment behaviors of veterans, 
maturation from delayed entry, education aid benefits for veterans, unobservable factors 
associated with selection into the military, or the direct effects of military service. Each 
potential explanation leads to a testable research hypothesis. In this chapter, I explain the 
data and methodology I use to test this set of hypotheses.  
I first detail the unique dataset used for this dissertation. I use administrative 
records from Georgia State University that have been de-identified by the Office of 
Institutional Research. As this dataset includes all students who enrolled at GSU during 
the study period, I avoid the limitations faced by most other researchers. Most of the 
commonly used, publicly available datasets only include first-time, full-time freshman or 
students who have filed the FAFSA; this almost certainly excludes a large segment of the 
student veteran population. Other researchers have used surveys of veterans, but these 
studies lack an appropriate comparison group of nonveterans. This research avoids those 
limitations. 
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After detailing how I operationalize each variable, I explain the methodological 
approaches used to test the hypotheses. I use OLS regression and logistic regression to 
assess three metrics of student success: grades, retention, and completion. I supplement 
these models with two additional analyses to strengthen the design. I leverage variations 
in the GI Bill program to assess whether higher levels of funding lead to better student 
success outcomes. I also use matching to test whether unobservable factors associated 
with military enlistment or the direct effects of military service could drive veteran 
student success. Finally, I conclude by reviewing the data and methodology and by 
looking ahead to the next chapter. 
 
3.2 Data 
Georgia State University (GSU) is a large, public research university in Atlanta, 
Georgia. GSU collects student-level data on an extensive set of variables for each student 
in the university. The Office of Institutional Research has provided a de-identified subset 
of this data for this research. The student data covers demographic and academic 
information for all GSU students in the population, including both veterans and 
nonveterans. The population includes students who first enrolled at GSU between the fall 
term in 2003 and the spring term of 2015. As recent cohorts have not had time to finish a 
bachelor’s degree, these will only be used in the analysis of short-term student success 
outcomes. 
Georgia State University is a unique institution in some respects. First, GSU is a 
large, urban, public research university. About 51,000 students were enrolled in the fall 
of 2016 and about 25,000 of those were undergraduates. The campus is located in 
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downtown Atlanta. As a result, GSU has historically had a small residential student 
population. Despite growth in recent years, only 21 percent of undergraduate students 
lived on campus in 2016. This might cause GSU students to be less academically and 
socially integrated than students on traditional campuses. Second, GSU enrolls more 
students from groups with historically low rates of degree completion than any other 
college in Georgia. In 2013, 56 percent received Pell grants, 30 percent were first-
generation students, and 60 percent were minorities. Third, graduation rates have 
significantly improved at GSU in recent years. Among first-time, full-time freshmen, the 
six-year graduation rate was 31 percent in 2003 but had risen to 53 percent by 2013. In 
the same year, these graduation rates were higher for minority students: 66 percent for 
Latinos, 57 percent for blacks, and 51 percent for whites. Students who receive Pell 
Grants are no less likely to graduate. Administrators at GSU attribute the improvements 
to the supplemental instruction program (a peer tutoring program), freshman learning 
communities (major-based residence hall assignments with additional support), micro-
grant programs to cover small gaps in tuition payments, and data analytics systems that 
support advising and administrative decision-making. As a result of these factors, 
studying GSU students may impact the results. Because of GSU’s success graduating 
black and low income students, veterans at GSU could be more successful than veterans 
at other large universities in or near Atlanta (e.g., Georgia Tech, University of Georgia, 
Emory University). 
The data used in this dissertation include records for students who entered GSU 
from the fall semester of 2003 until the spring semester of 2015. This includes 96,237 
students enrolled for a bachelor’s degree. Graduation information is available through the 
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spring semester of 2017. For the graduation models, I use as many cases as possible; so 
for the six-year models, I include every cohort that has at least six years of data after 
entry. As a result, sample sizes for the graduation models differ. Veterans are a small 
proportion of the students seeking bachelor’s degrees. There are only 2,144 identified 
student veterans, which comprise 2.23% of the students during the study period. 
 
3.3 Data Limitations 
The nature of the data used for this dissertation overcomes many of the limitations 
inherent in past research on student veterans. However, the GSU data has two main 
shortcomings. First, GSU does not systematically collect veteran status from each 
student. Instead, veterans (along with students who are active duty, National Guard, 
reserves, or military dependents) are identified as such in the data system when they 
contact the GSU Military Outreach Center in order to utilize military education benefits. 
Alternatively, individuals can identify themselves as veterans to the Military Outreach 
Center, which the office encourages but cannot mandate. Thus, some student veterans at 
GSU are not identified. This could include veterans who have exhausted education 
benefits prior to entry at GSU, have transferred education benefits to dependents, or have 
chosen to save benefits for later usage. However, I expect that unidentified veterans are a 
very small proportion of the total GSU veteran population, because the low eligibility bar 
for the Post-9/11 GI Bill (serving after 9/11/2001 for at least 90 days, or fewer if 
honorably discharged) and the prevalence of additional veteran education benefits (e.g., 
the Department of Defense Tuition Assistance program) mean that most student veterans 
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are likely to qualify for at least some benefits. Still, it is impossible to know how large 
this group is and how their exclusion will introduce bias into the results. 
Second, missing values also limit the utility of the data. Academic background 
variables are missing for large numbers of students, particularly veterans. Students who 
delayed entry more than five years from high school graduation or who enter with more 
than 30 hours of transfer credit are generally missing both high school GPA and 
ACT/SAT test scores. More than 45% of nonveterans and more than 65% of veterans are 
missing at least one academic background variable.  
Additionally, some students are missing data on traditional measures of 
socioeconomic status. In the GSU dataset, this information is taken from FAFSA 
submissions. As a result, students who never file the FAFSA during their tenure at GSU 
have missing values. Although 87% of nonveterans and 88% of veterans file a FAFSA at 
some point while at GSU, veterans using the GI Bill do not have to file in order to use 
benefits. Thus, the veterans with the most funding may be missing values for the SES 
variables. If this is the case, excluding these students could bias student success outcomes 
for veterans.  
Some of the common pitfalls of administrative records datasets are also present 
here. Across the college career, some students are missing values for other variables in 
some semesters. For some students, time-invariant characteristics (like race) change over 
time at GSU. 
I take several steps to address these missing data problems. Since the delayed 
entry students are required to take the Compass exam to determine remedial course 
placement, I convert scores from the Compass exam to ACT score equivalencies. I 
  51 
compute the ACT score equivalencies for both Compass and SAT scores using 
concordances developed by the College Board and ACT (Dorans 1999, ACT 2009). For 
the other missing academic background values, I use imputation methods. This is 
appropriate since the academic background variables only serve as control variables in 
these analyses. Since the missing values are systematically missing for certain types of 
students but not necessarily systematically biased, these are classified as missing at 
random (MAR). Researchers typically recommend multiple imputation methods in this 
situation (Rubin 1987, Horton and Kleinman 2007). These methods involve creating 
several sets of imputed values for the cases with missing data, computing estimates (e.g., 
regression coefficients) with each of set of imputed values, then combining these results 
with special rules. However, one downside is that the combining rules are unreliable for 
some estimates that are easy to interpret, like average partial effects and average marginal 
effects. Because of this, I use a crude imputation method of imputing a zero for the 
missing value and adding a dummy variable for each academic background variable to 
indicate whether a case has an imputed value for it. This approach allows the inclusion of 
the missing cases but the dummy variable prevents the introduction of bias. Long and 
Kurlaender (2009) have also used this approach to deal with missing values in 
postsecondary education research. To ensure this crude method does not skew results, I 
also perform multiple imputations with chained equations (MICE) using predictive mean 
matching (Horton and Kleinman 2007; White, Royston, and Wood 2011). In the MICE 
procedure, I compute a set of 20 imputations and use the 3 nearest neighbors in the 
predictive mean matching procedure. The results from both imputation methods are very 
similar and reported in the next chapter. 
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For socioeconomic status, I use an alternative measure available for students 
regardless of FAFSA-filing behavior. I use the student’s ZIP code to add mean income in 
the home ZIP code as a proxy for SES. To ensure the reliability of this approach, I also 
compute the models for the subset of students who file the FAFSA using first-generation 
student status and gross financial need8 as measures of SES. When these results differ, I 
estimate the models using the Heckman method to correct for sample selection bias 
(Heckman 1979, Wooldridge 2009). The Heckman correction uses a two-stage approach 
to first model selection into the sample and then use the results to model the outcome of 
interest. In this case, values on covariates are unobserved for students who do not file the 
FAFSA. I use the Heckman procedure to first model FAFSA filing behavior, and then 
estimate student success outcomes. I find that results from both approaches are very 
similar and are reported in the following chapter. 
When other variables have missing values in certain semesters or vary across 
semesters, I make adjustments based on observed data when reasonable. When variables 
that do not change over time (e.g., race, high school GPA) are missing in some semesters, 
I use values for that student from earlier or later semesters. When the variables that 
should not change over time actually do vary across semesters, I use the most commonly 
reported value for that student. However, I make no adjustments for veteran status or the 
student success outcomes. 
 
  
                                                        
8 Gross financial need is the difference between the cost of attendance and the estimated 
family contribution. 
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3.4 Variables 
 
3.4.1 Dependent Variables 
3.4.1.1 First-Year GPA 
This variable indicates the student’s cumulative college GPA after one full 
academic year (i.e., after two non-summer terms). For students who do not complete the 
entire first academic year, I use the cumulative GPA at the last point during that academic 
year.  
 
3.4.1.2 First-Year Retention 
This variable indicates that the student is still enrolled one year after his or her 
initial enrollment term. This is a computed dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the student is 
enrolled one year after the matriculation term. For summer entrants, I code 1 if the 
student is enrolled in either the summer or fall term one year later. 
 
3.4.1.3 Graduation 
I compute a set of variables to identify degree completion. I use a dichotomous 
variable to denote whether a student ever finished his or her degree, and a set to denote 
whether he or she finished within 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 years from the matriculation term. 
These are computed from the graduation term variable and the matriculation term 
variable. I use data from the National Student Clearinghouse to compute a set of 
graduation from anywhere variables for the primary models. I also construct a set of 
graduation-from-GSU variables for use in an alternate specification. 
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3.4.2 Independent Variables 
3.4.2.1 Veteran Status 
This is the primary independent variable of interest, which indicates prior 
participation in the military. This is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 for veterans. 
Students are classified as veterans if they have used veteran education benefits at any 
time during their college career or if they have identified themselves as a veteran without 
benefits to the Veteran Outreach Office. This variable is constructed from the GSU 
veteran type variable. 
Students who report that they are either active duty, a member of the National 
Guard, or a Reservist in the armed forces are not classified as veterans. There are likely 
few (if any) students who enroll while on active duty, since this would impose time, 
energy, and geographic limitations to postsecondary participation. Those in the National 
Guard or the Reserves likely exhibit irregular enrollment patterns as these students may 
be deployed while enrolled (Ackerman et al 2009; DiRamio et al 2008; Cate 2014b). 
These deployments cause discontinuous enrollment. If activated mid-semester, the 
student could lose credits that were in-progress at that time and may need to delay 
reenrollment for several months until the next term begins. Those who re-enroll may also 
be misaligned with course sequences that include intermittently offered classes, further 
delaying degree completion (Rumann and Hamrick 2010). Additionally, those using 
veteran survivor/dependent benefits are not classified as veterans. 
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3.4.2.2 Female 
This dichotomous variable represents sex. I code female students as 1 and male 
students as 0. 
 
3.4.2.3 Race 
This variable indicates the race/ethnicity of the student and is constructed from 
two separate race and ethnicity variables. Race is self-reported and students can select 
any applicable race from Asian, black, American Indian, white, Pacific Islander, and 
other. Students can also identify as Hispanic in the ethnicity question. I recode race into 
white, black, Hispanic, Asian, other/mixed categories. I also include a category for those 
who did not report a race. I classify any student ever reporting Hispanic status on the 
ethnicity question as being Hispanic, so that Hispanic is a mutually exclusive race 
category. Students who select more than one race are classified as Other/Biracial. 
Students who have different races in different semesters are classified as the most 
commonly reported race during the student’s academic career. 
 
3.4.2.4 Socioeconomic Status 
This variable is a measure of class. I use the mean household income by ZIP code 
as a proxy for socioeconomic status. I use income data from the 2006-2010 American 
Community Survey compiled by the Michigan Population Studies Center. Mean ZIP 
income is a continuous variable in ten thousands of dollars. In line with Long and 
Kurlaender (2009), the models also include a squared term. As an alternate specification 
of SES I also use the gross financial need and first generation student status variables, but 
  56 
these are only available for FAFSA-filers. I use a continuous measure of gross need in 
thousands of dollars. I follow the GSU protocol for first generation status and classify the 
student as first generation if both the mother and father have some college experience, a 
postsecondary certificate, an associate’s degree, a high school diploma or lower listed as 
the highest earned degree. If at least one parent has earned a bachelor’s degree, the 
student is classified as not a first generation student. The student is classified as unknown 
first generation student status if the student reports either unknown/other levels of 
education for both parents, or unknown/other education for one parent and the other has a 
high school diploma or lower. 
 
3.4.2.5 High School Grade Point Average 
This variable serves as one of the academic background indicators. I take the 
value calculated by the GSU based on high school courses and grades, which disregards 
+/- variations and additional weighting given to AP courses. Because the effects of 
academic preparation vary with level of preparation, the models also include a squared 
term to capture nonlinear effects of high school GPA (Kuh et al. 2008, Long and 
Kurlaender 2009, Curs and Harper 2012). 
 
3.4.2.6 Standardized Test Scores 
These two variables (for math and English) serve as additional academic 
background indicators. I use scores from the ACT, SAT, and Compass exams. The 
Compass exams are math and English subject tests that determine remedial course 
placements. Older students aren’t required to take the SAT or the ACT before 
  57 
matriculating at GSU, but they are required to take the Compass exams. Since most 
students only take one of these standardized exams, I convert the Compass and SAT 
scores into ACT-equivalent scores by using the concordances developed by the College 
Board and ACT (Dorans 1999, ACT 2009). The ACT scores range from 1 to 36. I use the 
highest score if a student has multiple scores for an exam or scores from multiple kinds of 
tests. I use both an ACT math-equivalent score and an ACT English-equivalent score. 
The models also include squared terms to capture nonlinear relationships (Kuh et al. 
2008, Long and Kurlaender 2009). 
 
3.4.2.7 Advanced Placement Credit 
This variable serves as one of the academic background indicators. This is a 
continuous measure of the number of credit hours GSU awarded for AP testing. It is 
coded zero for those with no AP credit or a missing value. The models also include a 
squared term to include nonlinear relationships. 
 
3.4.2.8 Student Aid 
These variables indicate the amount of student aid received by type in the first 
semester. I separate student aid into grants, loans, and scholarships. Although both 
scholarships and grants do not require payment, scholarships are typically merit-based 
and grants are typically need-based. I use thousands of dollars for each. Aid from the GI 
Bill is not included any of these categories (see below). GI Bill payment amounts are 
only available for most veterans using the Post-9/11 GI Bill in or after the fall 2009 
semester.  
  58 
 
3.4.2.9 Transfer Hours 
This continuous variable indicates the number of hours of transfer credit. The 
models also include a squared term to capture nonlinear effects. 
 
3.4.2.10 Part-Time Status 
I construct this dichotomous variable from the attempted credit hours to indicate 
the enrollment status of the student (i.e., whether the student has attended part-time rather 
than full-time). Students sometimes fluctuate between part- and full-time statuses across 
semesters. In the graduation models, I follow Adelman (2006) and code a student as part-
time if he or she drops below 12 credit hours for any non-summer term. For the first year 
GPA and retention models, I only use the first year to compute part-time status. 
 
3.4.2.11 Early College GPA 
Although this is one of the dependent variables of interest, it is also a predictor of 
degree completion. I use first semester GPA in the primary models but also compute 
alternate specifications using first year GPA. I only use this as an independent variable in 
the graduation models. 
 
3.4.2.12 Age at Matriculation 
This variable indicates the age of the student at the time of matriculation. To 
impose the fewest assumptions on the shape of the relationships, I use a set of dummy 
variables for each age in the dataset. In the models, I use age 18 as the reference group. 
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3.4.2.13 Term of Entry 
Since GSU has improved graduation rates over time, I use a set of dummy 
variables that indicate term of entry. The earliest term, fall 2003, is used as the reference 
group. 
 
3.4.2.14 Post-9/11 GI Bill Usage 
This is a set of two dichotomous variables. The first indicates that a veteran is 
using funding from the newer, Post-9/11 GI Bill. The second indicates that a veteran first 
used funding from an older form of the GI Bill, but later used funding from the Post-9/11 
GI Bill. I construct these from the veteran type variable used by GSU. These variables are 
only used in the aid quasi-experiment. 
 
3.4.2.15 Post-9/11 GI Bill Aid 
These previous aid variables (grants, loans, and scholarships) do not include aid 
from the GI Bill. GI Bill payment amounts are only available for most veterans using the 
Post-9/11 GI Bill and only from the fall 2009 semester onward. I use thousands of dollars 
and only use this amount in the aid quasi-experiment.  
 
3.4.2.16 Veteran Dependent 
This dichotomous variable identifies students who have used education benefits 
that have been transferred from a veteran to a dependent or survivor. Veteran dependents 
are identified as such if they have used dependent/survivor benefits at any point during 
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their time as a student. As some veterans also receive dependent/survivor benefits, I only 
include dependents/survivors who have not also used veteran benefits during college. I 
construct this from the veteran type variable used by GSU. 
 
3.4.2.17 Geographic Military Presence 
This variable is only used to model propensity to enlist in the military. Although 
Kleykamp (2006) uses county-level recruiter density, this data is seemingly no longer 
available in the Defense Manpower Data Center. Instead, I calculate the military recruits 
per capita by ZIP code tabulation area (ZCTA). I use the Department of Defense 
recruitment data to tabulate the number of military enlistments by ZCTA between 2002 
and 2006 (Christensen 2015), then divide this by the ZTCA population from the Census 
Bureau (Bittner 2013).  
 
3.5 General Methodology and Justification 
To resolve the student veteran paradox, I examine how veteran status and related 
factors are associated with the three key student success outcomes: grades, retention, and 
completion.  
 
3.5.1 The Bias Explanation 
H1a: Veterans do not hold characteristics that inhibit student success 
H1b: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans 
I test the bias explanation by replicating the student veteran paradox with the 
GSU data. In contrast to past research, I use data that includes veterans who didn’t file 
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the FAFSA, veterans who attend part time, veterans who began at another institution, and 
nonveteran students who can serve as a fair comparison group. Theory suggests that 
veterans should be less successful students because they hold characteristics that predict 
worse student success outcomes, but past research has shown that veterans are at least as 
successful as nonveteran students. I first compare means and proportions of 
characteristics for veterans and nonveterans. I then compare means and proportions of the 
student success outcomes for veterans and nonveterans. For both, I also report differences 
and whether they are statistically significant. If the student veteran paradox stems from 
bias in past research due to limitations in data and methods, then either veterans at GSU 
will not hold characteristics that inhibit student success, or veterans at GSU will be less 
successful than nonveterans on the basic outcome measures. 
 
3.5.2 The Background, Enrollment, and Maturation Explanations 
H2: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
after controlling for background characteristics  
H3: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
after controlling for enrollment pattern variables  
H4: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
after controlling for age 
I test the background, enrollment, and maturation explanations by comparing 
student success outcomes for veterans and nonveterans while controlling for additional 
factors. To do so, I construct regression models for each of the three student success 
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outcomes of interest. As GPA is a continuous variable, I use OLS regression. Since 
retention is a binary outcome, I use a logit model.  
Graduation is usually measured as a dichotomous variable over a given time span, 
noting whether the student successfully completed a bachelor’s degree in, say, six years 
(four years and eight years are also used, although less commonly). This practice, 
however, leads to a time-framing problem: a student who finishes in 7 years will be 
identified as a non-completer when operationalized as such (even if we know the student 
eventually did finish). This also leads to a censoring problem, in which students who 
have not yet graduated during the study time period will either be discarded or counted as 
non-completers (even if they will go on to finish the degree).  
Although survival analysis is most suited to this type of situation, there are two 
important shortcomings. First, survival analysis results are difficult to interpret in a 
meaningful way. The results may show that certain types of students have differing 
hazard functions or conditional probabilities of graduation, but this is difficult to clearly 
map onto traditional ways of thinking about degree completion, such as graduating within 
six years. Second, and most significantly, estimating hazard functions is computationally 
difficult when individuals are not abundant in each time period. Since veterans are a very 
small proportion of students at GSU, estimation problems arise.  
Because of these issues, I use a set of logit models to measure degree completion 
over various time spans. I measure completion at four, five, six, seven, and eight years 
from matriculation. I also use a time-neutral measure of completion that denotes whether 
a student ever completed a degree, although I only use students who enter during or 
before the fall 2011 semester so there are at least six years of data available.  
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I refer to these as the primary models throughout the dissertation. Veteran status is 
the primary variable of interest in these models, but I control for background 
characteristics, enrollment patterns, and age at matriculation. Background characteristics 
include sex, race, socioeconomic status, and academic background. Enrollment behaviors 
include aid levels, transfer hours, and part-time status. I control for age with a set of 
dummy variables to impose the fewest assumptions about the shape of the relationships 
between age and the measures of student success. I also include a set of dummy variables 
for term of entry to control for institutional changes over time. 
For these models, I report the average partial effects and average marginal effects. 
These represent the average change in the predicted outcome due to a one-unit increase in 
the independent variable, holding the other variables in the model constant. In the GPA 
model, these are the changes in predicted first year GPA. For the logit models, these are 
the changes in the predicted probabilities of retention and graduation. Instead of reporting 
the average marginal effects for the age and term of entry variables, I compute the 
predicted outcomes for each value and graphically represent them. I also include the full 
regression models in the appendix. 
 
3.5.3 The Funding Explanation 
H5: Students with higher levels of veteran education benefits tend to have  
better student success outcomes than otherwise similar students 
I test the funding explanation with two approaches that examine how levels of 
military education benefits impact student success. First, I use a quasi-experimental 
design to leverage changes in the extent of GI Bill benefits to tease out the effects of the 
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aid. The Post-9/11 GI Bill applies to anyone who served after 9/11, but the law was 
passed in 2008 and went into effect in the fall of 2009. The Post-9/11 GI Bill had less 
restrictive eligibility requirements and more generous benefit levels. Veterans who were 
already using older versions of the GI Bill could upgrade to the newer, more generous 
version if eligible. Second, I use award amounts for veterans with the Post-9/11 GI Bill to 
assess the effects of different levels of aid. If the education funding is driving student 
success for veterans, then a higher “dosage” of the aid should result in even greater 
success. 
The first approach repeats the primary models from the previous chapter but adds 
three dummy variables to identify types of veteran benefit usage. The veteran variable 
still identifies all veterans. The first two new variables identify veterans who upgrade 
from older versions of the GI Bill to the more generous Post-9/11 GI Bill, and veterans 
who exclusively use the Post-9/11 GI Bill. As these two variables show the effect of 
using the Post-9/11 GI Bill beyond the base effect of being a veteran, they are technically 
interaction terms. Since the models control for changes over time, the interaction terms 
essentially serve as difference-in-differences estimators. The third new variable is a 
dummy variable to indicate whether a student used survivor/dependent education 
benefits. These students are nonveterans who receive veteran education funding. If the 
aid explanation is driving the veteran paradox, then outcomes should be similar for 
veterans and veteran dependents, and even better for those veterans using the more 
generous post-9/11 GI Bill. 
The second approach repeats the primary models from the previous chapter on the 
subset of Post-9/11 GI Bill recipients with award data, dropping the veteran dummy 
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variable and adding a continuous measure of GI Bill aid. In the GSU data, these award 
amounts are only available for veterans using the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Thus, I restrict the 
analysis to veterans using the Post-9/11 GI Bill who have award amount data for the first 
semester. If the aid explanation is driving the veteran paradox, then outcomes should be 
better for veterans who have larger GI Bill awards. 
 
The Selection and Direct Effects Explanations 
H6: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
who match characteristics associated with enlistment 
H7: Veterans have student success outcomes at least as good as nonveterans  
after controlling for all the aforementioned factors 
The veteran paradox could be explained by unobserved factors associated with 
selection into the military. Those who volunteer to serve in the armed forces may be 
inherently more mature or better at long-term planning. On the other hand, they could be 
more impulsive or less prepared for life after high school. These factors would impact 
student success outcomes. The fact that these are unobserved (at least in this research) 
makes it very difficult to control for them.  
I test the selection and direct effects hypotheses by repeating the primary models 
after using matching to create a balanced comparison group of nonveterans. Matching is 
typically used to deal with selection on observables, but if the relevant unobservables can 
be predicted by the observables, the procedure will also control for them. This is a strong, 
unverifiable assumption and illustrates a key weakness in this dissertation. However, 
matching is the most appropriate way to address selection within this context and 
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limitations of this research.9 I create the matched group of nonveterans using the sex, 
race, socioeconomic status, academic background, age, and geographic military presence 
variables. If selection explains the veteran paradox and the observables can predict the 
unobservables, then the effects of veteran status on retention and graduation will diminish 
or vanish after matching. If selection explains the veteran paradox and the observables 
cannot predict the unobservables, then the effects of veteran status on retention and 
graduation may stay the same after matching.  If the direct effects of military service are 
driving the veteran paradox, then the effects of veteran status will remain or even 
increase after matching. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The seven explanations to resolve the student veteran paradox each yield unique 
research hypotheses. I use a dataset of student-level administrative records from Georgia 
State University to test these hypotheses. I use OLS regression, logistic regression, and a 
combination of survival analysis and logistic regression to assess grades, retention, and 
completion, respectively. Additionally, I include two supplementary analyses to bolster 
my results: a quasi-experiment to address funding and propensity score matching to 
address selection. The specifications used are straightforward, logical, and largely already 
                                                        
9 An instrumental variables approach is more appropriate for dealing with unobservables 
related to selection. I also attempted to use geographic military presence as an 
instrumental variable. Although the results suggested that the primary models are robust 
to unobservables, these were ultimately excluded because of the weakness of the 
instrument and the incompatibility of the instrumental variables approach and situations 
with a binary treatment and a binary outcome.  
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established in the literature. In the next chapter, I present and discuss the first set of 
results from these analyses. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS FROM PRIMARY MODELS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Student veterans appear to be at least as successful as student nonveterans despite 
many characteristics that predict that veteran students should be less successful. I argue 
that seven competing explanations could potentially resolve this paradox: bias in past 
research, background characteristics, enrollment behaviors, maturation, aid, unobserved 
factors associated with selection, and direct effects of military service. This chapter 
presents findings from several analyses that test competing hypotheses from the bias, 
maturation, background, and enrollment explanations. To some extent, they also speak to 
the aid, selection, and direct effects explanations; however, these are addressed more 
directly in the following chapter. These results are the first steps in understanding and 
explaining the student veteran paradox. 
I first test the bias explanation by corroborating both parts of the student veteran 
paradox. First, theory predicts that veterans should be less successful students because 
they hold characteristics that inhibit student success. I compare means and proportions 
for veterans and nonveterans to confirm this half of the student veteran paradox. Veterans 
are more likely than nonveteran students to be male and black. Veterans have weaker 
academic backgrounds, are of lower socioeconomic status, and enter college later. On the 
other hand, veterans enter with more transfer hours and, contrary to expectations, are less 
likely to attend part-time. Second, past research has shown that veterans are at least as 
successful as nonveteran students. I report student success outcomes for each group to 
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substantiate the second half of the student veteran paradox. Veterans and nonveterans at 
this university generally have similar academic outcomes, with one exception. In contrast 
to past findings, first year GPA is lower for veterans. However, veterans are as likely as 
nonveterans to return after the first year. Surprisingly, veterans are more likely than 
nonveterans to graduate within four or five years, but have similar graduation rates within 
six years and beyond. The bias explanation can be ruled out for retention and completion, 
but not for first year grades. 
I next test the background, enrollment, and maturation explanations by examining 
the relationship between veteran status and student success outcomes while controlling 
for additional factors. These models incorporate background characteristics, enrollment 
patterns, and age of entry, along with controls for institutional changes over time. When 
controlling for other factors, predicted first year GPA is lower for veterans, but veterans 
are more likely to return after the first year and are more likely to graduate. The 
background explanation can be ruled out, but differing enrollment patterns help explain 
the veteran paradox for retention and completion. The maturation explanation explains 
why the difference in first year GPA widens in the multivariate model, but does not 
explain the differences that emerge in retention and completion. 
I also report the results of alternative versions of the primary models to justify 
methodological assumptions and illustrate model robustness. I repeat the primary models 
with alternate specifications of the graduation, early college GPA, and socioeconomic 
status variables, and with alternate imputation methods for the academic background 
variables. The results from these model variations are similar to those from the preferred 
primary models and provide additional confidence in them. I conclude by reviewing the 
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results from the primary models and by looking ahead to the next chapter, which presents 
secondary models that extend the results presented here. 
 
4.2 Characteristics of Nonveteran and Veteran Students 
I begin testing the bias explanation by characteristics held by nonveterans and 
veterans: 
H1a: Veterans do not hold characteristics that inhibit student success 
Nonveteran and veteran students are substantially different at Georgia State 
University (GSU). Table 1 compares characteristics for nonveteran and veteran students. 
As expected, student veterans hold many characteristics that predict lower probabilities of 
college success.  
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Table 1. Characteristics of Nonveterans and Veterans   
          
VARIABLES Nonveterans Veterans Difference  
          
Percentage Female 60 39 -21 ** 
     
Race, Percentage     
     White 36 31 -5 ** 
     Black 37 48 11 ** 
     Hispanic 8 8 0  
     Asian 11 3 -8 ** 
     Other/Biracial 4 5 1 + 
     No Race Given 5 5 0  
     
Mean ZIP Income $78,709 $74,001 -$4,708 ** 
Percentage Filed FAFSA 87 88 1  
Gross Financial Need $14,767 $14,750 -$17  
Percentage 1st Generation Student 20 23 3 ** 
Percentage Not 1st Generation Student 57 52 -5 ** 
Percentage Unknown 1st Gen Status 23 25 2 * 
     
High School GPA 3.29 3.16 -0.13 ** 
AP Credit 1.3 0.3 -0.9 ** 
ACT Math Score Equivalent 23.1 21.9 -1.3 ** 
ACT English Score Equivalent 22.5 22.1 -0.4 ** 
     
Grants (first-semester) $868 $788 -$80 ** 
Loans (first-semester) $1,936 $1,783 -$154 ** 
Scholarships (first-semester) $1,288 $535 -$754 ** 
     
Percentage Transfer Student 51 73 22 ** 
Transfer Hours 38.6 53.2 14.6 ** 
Percentage Part-Time Student (first-year) 31 26 -5 ** 
Percentage Part-Time Student (ever) 51 43 -8 ** 
     
Age at Matriculation 21.9 26.6 4.7 ** 
          
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Characteristics are very different for nonveteran and veteran students, generally in 
ways that are in line with expectations. Although 60% of nonveterans are women, only 
39% of veterans are female. Veterans are more likely to be black (48% of veterans versus 
37% of nonveterans) and less likely to be Asian (3% versus 11%). Veterans are of lower 
socioeconomic status on most measures. The mean income in the home ZIP code is about 
$5,000 lower for veterans than nonveterans, and veterans are 3 percentage points more 
likely to be first-generation students. However, the gross financial need—unadjusted cost 
of attendance minus expected family contribution—is slightly lower for veterans. 
Academic background variables are missing for large numbers of students, particularly 
students who delayed entry more than five years and transfer students. For those with 
data, mean high school GPA is .13 points lower for veterans, and mean ACT-equivalent 
scores are about a point lower for math and half a point lower for English.10 
Veterans also differ from nonveterans on enrollment variables. Nonveterans have 
higher amounts of each kind of aid than veterans, though it is important to note that GI 
Bill payments are not included in the aid variables.1112 Veterans have, on average, about 
$750 less in scholarships than nonveterans, but the differences are smaller for grants 
(about $80 less) and loans (about $150 less).1314 Veterans have nearly an additional 
                                                        
10 ACT scores range from 1 to 36. 
11 The VA makes GI Bill payments on behalf of the student rather than through 
traditional aid protocols. These payments are only available for some veterans and only 
for those who entered in the fall of 2009 or later. I utilize these in chapter 6. 
12 I estimate that a veteran qualifying for the full award amount at GSU would receive 
$14,448 for the fall 2017 semester. 
13 Scholarships are typically merit-based and grants are typically need-based, while loans 
require repayment. 
14 GI Bill payments are applied after other forms of aid, so having GI bill aid doesn’t 
prevent veterans from using other types of aid. 
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semester of transfer hours, but are less likely to be part-time students (both in the first 
year and throughout the college career). Because of military service, veterans are older 
than nonveteran students. Mean age at entry for veterans is nearly five years older than 
for nonveterans.  
 
4.3 Student Success Outcomes for Nonveteran and Veteran Students 
I test the second half of the bias explanation by comparing student success 
outcomes for veterans and nonveterans: 
H1b: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans 
In general, veterans perform at least as well as nonveterans on basic student 
success outcomes. Table 2 compares mean first year GPA and proportions for retention 
and graduation for both nonveterans and veterans. Student success outcomes are similar 
for nonveterans and veterans on nearly every measure. 
 
  74 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
Table 2. Postsecondary Outcomes for Nonveterans and Veterans  
          
     
VARIABLES Nonveterans Veterans Difference  
          
First-Year GPA 2.94 2.84 -0.10 ** 
     
Percentage Returning after First-Year  75 76 1  
     
Percentage Graduating Anywhere     
     in Four Years  39 47 8 ** 
     in Five Years 54 57 3 + 
     in Six Years 61 61 0  
     in Seven Years  64 63 -1  
     in Eight Years  65 66 1  
     Ever  68 69 1  
     
Percentage Graduating from GSU     
     in Four Years  34 41 7 ** 
     in Five Years  46 49 3 * 
     in Six Years  51 53 2 + 
     in Seven Years  52 54 2  
     in Eight Years  53 56 3  
     Ever  54 57 3 * 
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The only measure on which veterans perform worse on is first year GPA, which is 
.10 points lower for veterans. Veterans are at least as successful as nonveterans on other 
outcomes. About 70% of nonveterans and veterans return after the first year. Four-year 
graduation rates are higher for veterans: within four years, 39% of nonveterans graduate 
from any school but 47% of veterans do. Veterans also have higher four-year graduation 
rates from GSU (32 percent versus 28 percent). Graduation rates within five years and 
beyond are similar for nonveterans and veterans, however, both from GSU and from any 
school.  
These results show that veterans are at least as successful as nonveteran students 
on all outcome measures besides first year GPA. For graduation and retention (but not 
first year GPA), this seems to rule out the explanation that the veteran paradox stems 
from upwardly biased results from the past research on veterans. Most of the research on 
the veteran advantage in grades, though, was completed more than two decades ago. 
These findings are likely no longer relevant since contemporary veterans are different. 
Some veterans who were drafted into the military would have otherwise entered college 
directly. After the introduction of the all-volunteer force in 1974, it’s likely that many of 
those who were interested in and ready for college simply did not choose enlistment. 
 
4.4 Student Success Outcomes for Nonveteran and Veteran Students  
While Controlling for Other Factors 
I use the primary models in the analysis to test the background characteristics, 
enrollment patterns, and maturation explanations: 
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H2: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
after controlling for background characteristics 
H3: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
after controlling for enrollment pattern variables 
H4: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
after controlling for age 
The primary models illustrate the relationships between veteran status and the 
postsecondary student success outcomes while controlling for background characteristics, 
enrollment patterns, age at matriculation, and institutional changes over time. For each 
model, I present the average partial and average marginal effects. These effects represent 
the average change in the predicted outcome due to a one-unit increase in the independent 
variable, controlling for the other variables in the model.15 In the OLS models for GPA, 
these are equivalent to the coefficients unless there is a squared term, in which case the 
average marginal effect is computed using both terms. In the logit models, these are the 
changes in the predicted probabilities for retention and graduation. For the continuous 
independent variables that are treated as dummy variables (age and time), I present the 
predicted GPA and predicted probabilities of retention and graduation for each value. The 
discussion focuses on the average partial/marginal effects and the predicted outcomes but 
the regression coefficients for the full models can be found in the appendix. 
 
  
                                                        
15 Average marginal effects apply to continuous independent variables while average 
partial effects apply to binary independent variables. The interpretation is the same for 
both, although computation varies slightly. 
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4.4.1 First Year GPA 
Student veterans have lower first-year grade point averages than comparable 
nonveteran students (table 3). The predicted first year GPA for veterans is 0.16 points 
lower than for nonveteran students with the same characteristics. Surprisingly, this is 
even larger than the bivariate difference of means reported in the previous section 
(average first year GPA for veterans is 0.10 points lower than for nonveterans). There is a 
veteran disadvantage in first year grades that widens after controlling for background 
characteristics, enrollment patterns, and age. 
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Table 3. First Year GPA, Average Partial & Marginal Effects 
  
VARIABLES  
  
Veteran -0.155** 
 (0.017) 
Female 0.089** 
 (0.005) 
Race  
     Black -0.270** 
 (0.007) 
     Hispanic -0.087** 
 (0.010) 
     Asian -0.098** 
 (0.009) 
     Other/Biracial -0.151** 
 (0.014) 
     No Race Given -0.100** 
 (0.013) 
Mean ZIP Income (in $10,000s) 0.008** 
 (0.001) 
High School GPA 0.513** 
 (0.010) 
AP Credit 0.023** 
 (0.001) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent 0.013** 
 (0.001) 
ACT English Score Equivalent 0.008** 
 (0.001) 
Grants (first-semester, in $1,000s) -0.037** 
 (0.002) 
Loans (first-semester, in $1,000s) -0.024** 
 (0.001) 
Scholarships (first-semester, in $1,000s) 0.092** 
 (0.002) 
Transfer Hours 0.003** 
 (0.000) 
Part-Time Student (first-year) -0.328** 
 (0.006) 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Calculations for academic background variables  
exclude students with imputed values 
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The effects of the background variables in the model generally align with 
predictions from theory. Females have a predicted GPA nearly a tenth of a point higher 
than similar males. The predicted first year GPA is lower for all minority groups than for 
comparable white students. This gap is largest for blacks (.27 points below comparable 
white students), but still notable for students who are other or biracial (.15 lower), 
unwilling to provide a race (.10 lower), Asian (.10 lower), or Hispanic (.09 lower). It is 
surprising that even Asians, who typically are more successful students, have lower 
grades than comparable whites.  
Mean income is positively related to first year GPA, but the effect is smaller than 
expected. An additional $10,000 in mean ZIP code income increases predicted GPA by 
slightly less than a hundredth of a point for comparable students. Students with stronger 
academic backgrounds have higher grades in the first year. High school grades have the 
strongest impact: having a high school GPA an additional letter grade higher increases 
predicted first year GPA by half a letter grade. An additional hour of AP credit increases 
predicted first year GPA by about .02 points and an additional point on either the math or 
English section of the ACT increases it by about .01 points.  
The effects of enrollment variables are generally aligned with expectations. An 
additional $1,000 in scholarships increases predicted GPA by nearly a tenth of a point, 
but the same amount in grants or loans decreases it by .04 and .02, respectively. An 
additional hour of transfer credit improves predicted GPA but the effect is very small 
(.003). Enrollment intensity, however, has a substantial impact. Part time students have a 
predicted GPA a third of a letter grade lower than comparable full-time students.  
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The expected first year GPA is higher for students who are older or slightly 
younger than for comparable 18 year olds (the reference group). Figure 1 shows the 
predicted First Year GPA for comparable students at each matriculation age. Although 
the advantages are relatively modest for the ages near 18, the advantage grows quickly 
with age: those who enter at age 30 have an expected GPA half a letter grade higher than 
those who begin at 18 with the same characteristics. The advantage is at least as high for 
almost every age until 65, when the advantage begins to fizzle out.  
 
 
Figure 1. Predicted First Year GPA by Age at Matriculation 
 
First year GPA for comparable students has been generally increasing over time. 
Figure 2 shows predicted first year GPA for each term of entry. Expected first year GPA 
only shows a slight upward trend from the fall of 2003 through the fall semester of 2007; 
2
.8
3
3
.2
3
.4
3
.6
F
ir
s
t 
Y
e
a
r 
G
P
A
1815 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
Age at Matriculation
Predicted First Year GPA by Age at Matriculation
  81 
but students who enter GSU in or after the spring 2008 semester have significantly higher 
expected grades than comparable students who entered in the fall of 2003 (the reference 
group). A student who entered in the fall of 2013 has an expected first year GPA .21 
points higher than a similar student who started a decade earlier. This pattern is consistent 
with grade inflation, which has been noted at universities more generally over the past 
three decades (Rojstaczer and Healy, 2012). Binder, Ganderton, and Hutchens (2002) 
also suggest that state merit-based aid programs can lead to collegiate grade inflation, 
though Henry and Rubenstein (2002) find no evidence of merit aid causing high school 
grade inflation and the mechanisms should be similar in both high schools and colleges. 
On the other hand, better advising at GSU could better match students with appropriate 
courses, which could improve success.  
 
Figure 2. Predicted First Year GPA by Term of Entry 
2
.7
2
.8
2
.9
3
3
.1
F
ir
s
t 
Y
e
a
r 
G
P
A
Fa
ll 
20
03
Fa
ll 
20
04
Fa
ll 
20
05
Fa
ll 
20
06
Fa
ll 
20
07
Fa
ll 
20
08
Fa
ll 
20
09
Fa
ll 
20
10
Fa
ll 
20
11
Fa
ll 
20
12
Fa
ll 
20
13
Fa
ll 
20
14
Term of Entry
Predicted First Year GPA by Term of Entry
  82 
4.4.2 First Year Retention 
Veterans are more likely to return after the first year than comparable nonveterans 
(table 4). The predicted probability of continuing past the first year is 3.6 percentage 
points higher for veterans than for similar nonveterans. This is in sharp contrast to the 
bivariate differences reported in the previous section, which showed that veterans and 
nonveterans have virtually the same first year retention rates. There is a veteran 
advantage in retention even after controlling for background characteristics, enrollment 
patterns, and age. 
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Table 4. First-Year Retention, Average Partial & Marginal Effects 
  
VARIABLES  
  
Veteran 3.6** 
 (0.9) 
Female -0.6* 
 (0.3) 
Race  
     Black 3.3** 
 (0.4) 
     Hispanic 5.3** 
 (0.6) 
     Asian 8.8** 
 (0.5) 
     Other/Biracial 3.9** 
 (0.8) 
     No Race Given -8.1** 
 (0.7) 
Mean ZIP Income (in $10,000s) 0.4** 
 (0.1) 
High School GPA -2.0** 
 (0.5) 
AP Credit 1.1** 
 (0.1) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent 0.2** 
 (0.0) 
ACT English Score Equivalent -0.5** 
 (0.0) 
Grants (first-semester, in $1,000s) 1.2** 
 (0.1) 
Loans (first-semester, in $1,000s) 0.3** 
 (0.1) 
Scholarships (first-semester, in $1,000s) 3.6** 
 (0.1) 
Transfer Hours 0.1** 
 (0.0) 
Part-Time Student (first-year) -8.1** 
 (0.4) 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Calculations for academic background variables  
exclude students with imputed values 
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Some of the background variables in the retention model run counter to 
expectations. Women have a slightly lower probability of returning after the first year 
than similar men, but the difference is only about half of a percentage point. Surprisingly, 
all minority groups are more likely to return after year one than comparable whites. 
Compared with similar whites, the predicted probability of returning after the first year is 
5.3 percentage points higher for Hispanics, 3.9 percentage points higher for those of other 
and mixed races, and 3.3 percentage points higher for blacks. As expected, though, the 
advantage is largest for Asians (8.8 percentage points higher). Those who did not provide 
a race were 8.1 percentage points less likely to return after the first year than similar 
white students. One possible explanation for these findings is that white students are 
transferring rather than dropping out. As discussed later, graduation rates from any school 
are similar for comparable white and minority students. 
An extra $10,000 in mean income in one’s ZIP code only increases the probability 
of returning by about half a percentage point for equivalent students. Having a high 
school GPA a letter grade higher decreases the probability of returning for similar 
students by 2 percentage points. An additional hour of AP credit increases the predicted 
retention probability by just over a percentage point. Test scores have divergent, but very 
small effects: an extra point on the ACT math section increases the predicted retention 
probability by .2 percentage points but an extra point on the English section decreases it 
by .5 percentage points.  
Enrollment variables have notable, but unsurprising impacts. All forms of aid 
increase the probability of returning for the second year, but an extra $1,000 has the 
largest effect as scholarships (3.6 percentage points), followed by grants (1.2 percentage 
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point) and loans (0.3 percentage points). An additional hour of transfer credit increases 
the probability of retention but only by .01 percentage points. Students who enroll part 
time at any point in their first year are 8 percentage points less likely to return for the 
second than similar full-time students. 
Surprisingly, the probability of coming back for the second year varies only 
slightly across age groups. Figure 3 shows the predicted retention probability for each age 
at entry. Entrants who begin at 17 or 19 are less likely to return than comparable students 
who start as 18 year olds, as are those who enter in their mid- to late-twenties or mid-
thirties. Aside from these groups, retention is generally no more or less likely for other 
older students.  
 
 
Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Retention by Age at Matriculation 
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Across entry terms, the likelihood of returning after the first year shows no clear 
trend. Figure 4 shows the predicted retention probability by term of entry. Compared with 
the fall of 2003 (the reference term) the probability of returning is lower in subsequent 
terms through the spring of 2005 and is generally lower from the fall of 2013 onward. It 
is surprising that retention rates for comparable students have been stagnant or falling 
since graduation rates at GSU have dramatically increased over the past decade. One 
possible explanation is that the GSU student body has improved in quality; if this were 
the case, there should be no relationship between time and retention (or graduation) when 
controlling for student quality. 
 
 
Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Retention by Term of Entry 
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4.4.3 Degree Completion 
Student veterans are more likely to graduate than similar nonveteran peers (table 
5). The probability of graduating is higher for veterans than for comparable nonveterans 
in every time-to-graduation specification and the magnitude increases as the time horizon 
expands. In the four-, five-, and six-year graduation models, the probability of graduating 
is about 5 percentage points higher for veteran students than for similar nonveteran 
students. Veterans are 6 percentage points more likely to graduate within seven years, 
and slightly less than 8 percentage points more like to graduate within 8 years or to ever 
graduate within the study period. The differences between veterans and similar 
nonveterans here are much larger than bivariate graduation differences reported in the 
previous section. There is a clear veteran advantage in graduation even after controlling 
for background characteristics, enrollment patterns, and age. 
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Table 5. Graduation, Average Partial & Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 4.5** 4.9** 5.4** 6.0** 7.8** 7.5** 
 (1.1) (1.3) (1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.1) 
Female 3.1** 3.4** 3.4** 3.2** 3.4** 3.8** 
 (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) 
Race       
     Black 1.0* 0.5 0.5 1.0+ 0.6 0.7 
 (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.5) 
     Hispanic -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.2 1.4+ 
 (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (0.9) (1.0) (0.8) 
     Asian 3.2** 4.0** 4.7** 5.2** 5.0** 4.2** 
 (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) (0.7) 
     Other/Biracial -0.8 -2.9** -0.6 -0.2 -0.6 -0.8 
 (0.9) (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.1) 
     No Race Given -2.1** -4.1** -5.4** -5.7** -6.3** -7.3** 
 (0.8) (0.9) (0.9) (1.0) (1.0) (0.9) 
Mean ZIP Income (in $10,000s) 0.3** 0.6** 0.6** 0.7** 0.7** 0.5** 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
High School GPA 2.6** 5.2** 5.4** 5.2** 5.2** 3.7** 
 (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.9) (0.7) 
AP Credit 0.9** 0.7** 0.6** 0.7** 0.8** 0.6** 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent -0.2** 0.1+ 0.2** 0.2* 0.2* 0.3** 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
ACT English Score Equivalent -0.4** -0.7** -0.7** -0.7** -0.6** -0.6** 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
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     Table 5 (continued)       
       
Grants (first-semester, in $1,000s) -0.3+ -0.0 0.4+ 0.5* 0.6* 0.4+ 
 (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) 
Loans (first-semester, in $1,000s) -0.2* -0.2+ -0.0 -0.0 0.2 -0.1 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
Scholarships (first-semester, in $1,000s) 1.9** 2.1** 2.0** 2.1** 2.1** 2.0** 
 (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) 
Transfer Hours 0.5** 0.5** 0.4** 0.3** 0.3** 0.3** 
 (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Part-Time Student (ever) -19.7** -15.0** -10.0** -7.0** -5.6** -4.1** 
 (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) 
First-Semester GPA 14.8** 17.2** 16.5** 15.4** 14.5** 13.7** 
 (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) 
       
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Calculations for academic background variables exclude students with imputed values 
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Some background variables have notable effects, mostly in line with expectations 
based on past research. Female students are 3 to 4 percentage points more likely to 
graduate than comparable males. Asians are also more likely to graduate than comparable 
whites in every model: the probability of graduating is between 3 and 5.5 percentage 
points higher than for similar white students. Although black students are slightly more 
likely to graduate in the four-year model, white, black, Hispanic, and other/biracial 
students have essentially the same graduation probabilities. This is consistent with past 
research that shows the effects of race on graduate either shrink substantially or disappear 
completely when controlling for factors like academic background and socioeconomic 
status (Kao and Thompson, 2003; Adelman, 1999, 2006). Higher SES students have a 
higher likelihood of graduating: an extra $10,000 in mean income in the ZIP code 
increases the predicted probability of graduating by about half a percentage point.  
The academic background variables are all significantly associated with 
graduation, but the effects are largest for high school GPA. For comparable students, 
having a GPA an additional letter grade higher increases the predicted probability of 
graduating by 2.5 to 5.5 percentage points. An extra AP credit hour increases the 
probability of graduating by slightly less than a percentage point. For similar students, an 
extra point on the ACT subscore increases the probability of graduating by 0.2 percentage 
points for math and decreases it by 0.6 percentage points for English. 
Enrollment variables have large impacts that are consistent with past research. 
Students who enroll part-time for at least one non-summer semester are much less likely 
to graduate than full-time students. However, the size of the effect shrinks dramatically as 
the time horizon increases. Compared with similar full-time students, the probability of 
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graduating for a part-time student is 20 percentage points lower after four years, but is 
only 6 percentage points lower after eight years. This suggests that, to some extent, part-
time students merely take longer to graduate rather than being less likely to do so. Grants 
and loans have virtually no impact on graduation for similar students, although grants 
appear to have a small, positive effect on the probability of graduating within seven or 
eight years. However, an extra $1,000 in scholarships increases the probability of 
graduating by about 2 percentage points. An additional transfer hour increases the 
probability of graduating by between a quarter and half of a percentage point, with the 
effect decreasing as the time horizon increases. Having a first semester GPA a letter 
grade higher increases the predicted probability of graduating 14 to 17 percentage points.  
Older students are less likely to graduate than similar students who begin college 
at (or shortly after) age 18. Figure 5 shows the predicted probability of graduation by age 
of entry. Only college students who enter between ages 19 and 23 are more likely to 
graduate within four years than comparable students who enter at 18. However, over 
longer time spans older students are less likely to graduate. Compared with similar 18 
year olds, the probability of graduating is lower for each age from 22 through 55, and 
frequently thereafter. As the time horizon expands, the probability curve shifts upward 
but the pattern remains the same. 
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Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Graduating by Age at Matriculation 
 
Across time, the probability of graduating has remained stagnant for similar 
students. Figure 6 shows the predicted probability of graduation by term of matriculation. 
Compared with students who entered in the fall of 2003, the likelihood of graduation is 
lower for students in some later spring and summer entry terms but there is no evidence 
that graduation rates for comparable students are improving over time. This is also 
surprising since graduation rates at GSU have been increasing substantially over the past 
decade. Again, this might be explained by increasing student quality. Another possibility 
is that GSU has only made progress in graduation rates for first time, full time students 
who begin in the fall, as these are the students included in those calculations. 
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Figure 6. Predicted Probability of Graduation by Term of Entry 
 
 
4.4.4 Discussion 
These models show the relationships between student success outcomes and 
veteran status while controlling for background characteristics, enrollment patterns, age 
at matriculation, and institutional changes over time. Even though veterans have lower 
first year grades than similar nonveterans, they are more likely than comparable 
nonveterans to return after the first year and to eventually graduate. The surprising 
finding that older students have higher first year grades explains why the gap between 
veterans and nonveterans widens when controlling for age of entry, as does the fact that 
veterans are more likely to enroll full-time. Differences in background characteristics 
cannot explain veterans’ retention and graduation advantage, since that advantage widens 
when controlling for these characteristics. The enrollment behaviors of veterans, 
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however, do help explain the student veteran paradox. Part of veterans’ advantage in 
retention and graduation is that, at least at GSU, they are more likely to enroll full time 
and are more likely to begin with transfer credit. However, the veteran advantage still 
persists after controlling for these factors. This suggests that student veteran paradox is 
due, at least in part, to military education benefits, unobserved factors associated with 
enlistment, or the direct effects of military service. These explanations are the subject of 
the next chapter. 
 
4.5 Variations on Primary Models 
In recent years, social scientists have been criticized for publishing statistically 
significant results that cannot be replicated. At best, this is a result of the many decisions 
researchers make regarding statistical tests, variable specifications, model specifications, 
and underlying assumptions. To allay criticisms of this kind, I construct additional 
variations of the primary models to provide additional evidence for robustness and 
assumption legitimacy. These model variations use alternate variable specifications and 
differing sample restrictions. Although these models typically use the same control 
variables as the primary models, the tables that follow present only the relevant subsets of 
effects and coefficients. 
 
4.5.1 Alternate Specification: Graduation Site 
In the above graduation models, the dependent variables are graduation from any 
university. This includes Georgia State University and any other college that shares data 
with the National Student Clearinghouse. Tables 6 a and b show a comparison of relevant 
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results from models that use graduation from GSU (6a) and graduation from anywhere 
(6b) as the dependent variables. Since veterans are more likely to graduate elsewhere than 
nonveteran students, graduation models that use GSU graduation as the dependent 
variable show somewhat weaker coefficients. The overall patterns for veterans are still 
the same and the average partial effect sizes are almost exactly the same in both 
specifications, though the effect is slightly smaller for GSU graduation in the four-year 
model.  
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Table 6a. Graduation from GSU, Average Partial Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 3.3** 4.6** 5.7** 6.2** 7.2** 7.6** 
 (1.1) (1.3) (1.4) (1.6) (1.7) (1.4) 
       
Observations 65,125 57,731 50,611 43,601 36,660 50,608 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, 
black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP 
income squared, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, 
AP credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score equivalent, ACT math score equivalent 
squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent, ACT 
English score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, 
scholarships, transfer hours, transfer hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA, 
age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 6b. Graduation from Anywhere, Average Partial Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 4.5** 4.9** 5.4** 6.0** 7.8** 7.5** 
 (1.1) (1.3) (1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.1) 
       
Observations 65,125 57,731 50,611 43,601 36,660 50,608 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, 
black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP 
income squared, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, 
AP credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score equivalent, ACT math score equivalent 
squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent, ACT 
English score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, 
scholarships, transfer hours, transfer hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA, 
age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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4.5.2 Alternate Specification: Early College GPA 
The graduation models include first semester GPA as an independent variable, but 
past research has typically used first year GPA instead. First semester GPA was chosen 
over first year GPA to diminish endogeneity problems and to preserve large sample sizes 
(as those who do not complete an entire academic year will not have a first year GPA). 
Tables 7 a and b show the relevant results of versions of graduation models that use first 
year GPA (7a) and first semester GPA (7b). Graduation models that use first year GPA in 
place of first semester GPA show the same patterns, although the effects for veteran 
status are slightly weaker in some time horizons when using first year GPA.  
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Table 7a. Graduation from Anywhere, Average Partial & Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 4.2** 4.0** 4.2** 4.7** 6.1** 6.2** 
 (1.2) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.4) (1.1) 
First-Year GPA 20.9** 22.5** 20.8** 19.4** 18.0** 16.8** 
 (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) 
       
Observations 58,375 51,700 45,232 38,866 32,498 45,229 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, 
black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP 
income squared, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, 
AP credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score equivalent, ACT math score equivalent 
squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent, ACT 
English score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, 
scholarships, transfer hours, transfer hours squared, part time student, age at 
matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 7b. Graduation from Anywhere, Average Partial & Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 4.5** 4.9** 5.4** 6.0** 7.8** 7.5** 
 (1.1) (1.3) (1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.1) 
First-Semester GPA 14.8** 17.2** 16.5** 15.4** 14.5** 13.7** 
 (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) 
       
Observations 65,125 57,731 50,611 43,601 36,660 50,608 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, 
black, Hispanic, Asian, other/biracial, no race given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income 
squared, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, AP 
credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score equivalent, ACT math score equivalent 
squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent, ACT 
English score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, 
scholarships, transfer hours, transfer hours squared, part time student, age at 
matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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4.5.3 Alternate Specification: Socioeconomic Status 
In the models presented in the previous section, socioeconomic status is 
operationalized as mean income by ZIP code (and a squared term). This specification was 
chosen as other measures of SES are only available for students who filed the FAFSA. 
Even though 80% of all students at GSU (and 81% of veteran students) filed in at least 
one academic year, excluding those who did not file notably reduces the sample size. 
More importantly, FAFSA-filers are less likely to graduate than non-filers, so excluding 
the latter group risks biasing the results. Moreover, veterans who have full funding from 
the GI Bill may be less likely to file the FAFSA and possibly more likely to succeed. 
Table 8 shows the relevant results of the first year GPA model with varying 
specifications of SES. The effects are virtually the same across all models. As such, I do 
not include a correction method for selection among FAFSA filers for GPA. 
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Table 8. First Year GPA with Alternate SES Specifications, Average Partial & Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FAFSA vars income vars 
(FAFSA filers) 
income vars  
(all students) 
    
Veteran -0.153** -0.149** -0.155** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) 
1st Gen Status Unknown -0.046**   
 (0.009)   
1st Generation -0.008   
 (0.007)   
Gross Financial Need (in $1,000s) 0.000   
 (0.001)   
Mean ZIP Income (in $10,000s)  0.022** 0.018** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Observations 57,184 63,462 70,893 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, AP credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score 
equivalent, ACT math score equivalent squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent, ACT English 
score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer hours squared, 
part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 9 shows the relevant results of the retention model with varying 
specifications of SES. Although the effects display the same patterns, their magnitude is 
slightly different across the first three models. Thus, I also include a fourth model that 
uses the Heckman selection method to correct for the selection bias among FAFSA filers. 
The average partial effects are fairly consistent across models. Compared with 
nonveterans who hold similar characteristics, the probability of returning after the first 
year is between 2.5 and 3.6 percentage points higher for veterans.  
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Table 9. First Year Retention with Alternate SES Specifications, Average Partial & Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FAFSA vars income vars 
(FAFSA filers) 
income vars (all 
students) 
FAFSA vars 
(Heckman 
Correction) 
     
Veteran 2.5* 3.3** 3.6** 2.9** 
 (1.0) (0.9) (0.9) (1.1) 
1st Gen Status Unknown -1.9**   -1.8** 
 (0.5)   (0.5) 
1st Generation -3.0**   -2.9** 
 (0.4)   (0.4) 
Gross Financial Need (in $1,000s) -0.2**   -0.2** 
 (0.0)   (0.1) 
Mean ZIP Income (in $10,000s)  1.3** 1.2**  
  (0.2) (0.2)  
     
Observations 68,345 75,502 86,416 67,297 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, AP credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score 
equivalent, ACT math score equivalent squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent, ACT English 
score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer hours squared, 
part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Tables 10 a, b, c, and d show relevant results from versions of the graduation 
models with varying specifications of SES. Although the effects of the veteran variables 
differ between models that use mean ZIP income and the FAFSA variables, the model 
that uses mean ZIP income with an equivalent sample (i.e., only FAFSA filers) looks 
quite similar to the model that uses gross need and parental education. These models 
show slightly weaker effects for the veteran variable. Using the Heckman selection 
method leads to similar, though slightly weaker, average partial effects as the primary set 
of graduation models. Depending on the time horizon, the probability of graduating is 
between 4 and 8 percentage points higher for a veteran than a comparable nonveteran. 
Overall, the consistency in results suggests that using mean ZIP income in the primary 
models is a justifiable specification for use with the full sample.  
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Table 10a. Graduation Using FAFSA variables (FAFSA filers only), Average Partial & Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 3.4** 3.7* 3.9* 4.1* 6.5** 5.7** 
 (1.3) (1.5) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.3) 
1st Gen Status Unknown -1.7** -2.7** -2.9** -2.3** -2.7** -1.5* 
 (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (0.7) 
1st Generation -0.2 -2.2** -2.8** -2.2** -2.2** -2.7** 
 (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.5) 
Gross Financial Need (in $1,000s) -0.3** -0.3** -0.3** -0.2** -0.2+ -0.2** 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
       
Observations 50,259 43,680 37,393 31,381 25,546 37,393 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, AP credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score 
equivalent, ACT math score equivalent squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent, ACT English 
score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer hours squared, 
part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 10b. Graduation using mean income variables (FAFSA filers only), Average Partial & Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 4.2** 4.0** 4.5** 4.6** 6.6** 6.4** 
 (1.2) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.2) 
Mean ZIP Income (in $10,000s) 0.6* 1.1** 1.1** 1.5** 1.1** 1.0** 
 (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) 
       
Observations 56,595 49,671 43,021 36,551 30,248 43,018 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, AP credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score 
equivalent, ACT math score equivalent squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent, ACT English 
score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer hours squared, 
part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 10c. Graduation using mean income variables (all students), Average Partial & Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 4.5** 4.9** 5.4** 6.0** 7.8** 7.5** 
 (1.1) (1.3) (1.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.1) 
Mean ZIP Income (in $10,000s) 0.8** 1.5** 1.7** 1.8** 1.6** 1.4** 
 (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) 
       
Observations 65,125 57,731 50,611 43,601 36,660 50,608 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, AP credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score 
equivalent, ACT math score equivalent squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent, ACT English 
score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer hours squared, 
part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 10d. Graduation using FAFSA variables with Heckman Correction, Average Partial & Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 3.6** 3.5* 3.6* 4.0* 6.4** 5.7** 
 (1.3) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.9) (1.4) 
1st Gen Status Unknown -1.9** -2.8** -3.0** -2.4** -2.5** -1.5* 
 (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (0.7) 
1st Generation -0.3 -2.2** -3.0** -2.4** -2.4** -2.8** 
 (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.5) 
Gross Financial Need (in $1,000s) -0.3** -0.3** -0.3** -0.2* -0.2 -0.2** 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
       
Observations 49,448 42,935 36,716 30,775 25,087 36,716 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, AP credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score 
equivalent, ACT math score equivalent squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent, ACT English 
score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer hours squared, 
part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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4.5.4 Missing Data and Imputation 
Missing data on academic background variables presents a substantial challenge 
in this research. Transfer students are not required to provide high school GPA or 
standardized scores when applying to GSU. Students who have been out of high school 
for more than five years but have fewer than 30 transfer hours are required to take the 
Compass exam to determine remedial course placement16, but high school GPA is not 
required. Thus, many students are missing values for these academic background 
variables. As a result, using listwise deletion for missing values on the academic 
background variables in the above models excludes more than half of the initial sample 
and also introduces bias into the results.  
Tables 11, 12, and 13 a-f show the coefficients on key variables in models with 
varying academic background measures, sample equivalencies, and imputation methods. 
Because of challenges in computing average marginal and average partial effects with 
multiply imputed data, these tables all report regression coefficients. In each table, model 
1 shows the results of including academic background using listwise deletion for the 
missing cases. Model 2 excludes high school GPA from the regression and model 3 
excludes both high school GPA and standardized test scores. Compared with the primary 
model from the previous section, the veteran coefficients are attenuated in the listwise 
deletion model. As the academic background variables are removed sequentially in 
models 2 and 3, the veteran coefficients strengthen. Yet, when model 3 is repeated with 
an equivalent sample from model 1 (i.e., model 4 excludes academic background 
                                                        
16 The Compass exam was replaced by the Accuplacer exam at GSU in 2017, but this 
change is outside the timeframe for this study. 
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variables but omits students who have missing values for those variables), the veteran 
coefficients are very similar to those from model 1 instead of model 3. This demonstrates 
that excluding those students with missing academic background variables systematically 
biases the other coefficients in the model. Thus, an imputation method (or alternative 
solution) is necessary. 
Model 5 shows the results of model 1 (i.e., the full model that includes academic 
background variables) after missing values on the academic background variables have 
been imputed by multiple imputation using chained equations. Finally, model 6 repeats 
the primary models from the previous section. These use the crude method of imputing a 
zero for missing values and adding a dummy variable to indicate that a case was missing 
said value. Although the multiple imputation method is more theoretically appropriate, 
the crude imputation method was chosen for the primary models to allow for estimation 
of the average partial effects to enhance interpretation. However, the results of both the 
multiple imputation and the crude imputation methods are very similar; this bolsters 
confidence in the primary models.  
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Table 11. First Year GPA with Missing Data & Imputation for Academic Background 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Full (no 
imputation) 
No HS 
GPA 
No HS 
GPA or 
Scores 
No HS 
GPA or 
Scores with 
sample 
from (1) 
Full 
(MICE) 
Full (crude 
imputation) 
       
Veteran -0.031 -0.077** -0.150** -0.027 -0.138** -0.155** 
 (0.030) (0.025) (0.018) (0.032) (0.018) (0.017) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent 0.069** 0.096**   0.084** 0.084** 
 (0.009) (0.007)   (0.007) (0.007) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent squared -0.001** -0.002**   -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
ACT English Score Equivalent 0.050** 0.053**   0.058** 0.062** 
 (0.007) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.006) 
ACT English Score Equivalent squared -0.001** -0.001**   -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
High School GPA -0.946**    -0.150* -0.951** 
 (0.097)    (0.071) (0.098) 
High School GPA squared 0.232**    0.094** 0.223** 
 (0.015)    (0.011) (0.015) 
Missing High School GPA      -0.778** 
      (0.155) 
Missing ACT Math Score Equivalent      0.993** 
      (0.082) 
Missing ACT English Score Equivalent      0.789** 
      (0.063) 
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     Table 11 (continued)       
       
Observations 38,810 49,239 70,893 38,810 70,435 70,893 
R-squared 0.276 0.223 0.210 0.207  0.246 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income squared, AP credit, AP credit squared, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer 
hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Table 12. Retention with Missing Data & Imputation for Academic Background 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Full (no 
imputation) 
No HS 
GPA 
No HS 
GPA or 
Scores 
No HS 
GPA or 
Scores with 
sample 
from (1) 
Full 
(MICE) 
Full (crude 
imputation) 
       
Veteran 0.387** 0.182* 0.194** 0.384** 0.126+ 0.220** 
 (0.129) (0.091) (0.057) (0.129) (0.066) (0.057) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent 0.267** 0.239**   0.189** 0.250** 
 (0.032) (0.024)   (0.025) (0.023) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent squared -0.006** -0.005**   -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.000) 
ACT English Score Equivalent -0.026 0.049**   0.062** 0.068** 
 (0.027) (0.019)   (0.018) (0.019) 
ACT English Score Equivalent squared -0.000 -0.002**   -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
High School GPA -1.533**    0.085 -0.805* 
 (0.356)    (0.186) (0.317) 
High School GPA squared 0.212**    -0.035 0.104* 
 (0.055)    (0.031) (0.050) 
Missing High School GPA      -1.313** 
      (0.499) 
Missing ACT Math Score Equivalent      2.314** 
      (0.265) 
Missing ACT English Score Equivalent      0.531* 
      (0.210) 
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     Table 12 (continued)       
       
Observations 46,049 58,233 86,416 46,049 81,391 86,416 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income squared, AP credit, AP credit squared, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer 
hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
  114 
Table 13a. Graduation with Missing Data & Imputation for Academic Background; Full (no imputation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 0.303* 0.124 0.191 0.212 0.407* 0.438** 
 (0.134) (0.131) (0.146) (0.168) (0.195) (0.156) 
High School GPA -2.649** -2.779** -2.235** -1.818** -1.415** -2.068** 
 (0.391) (0.392) (0.417) (0.459) (0.496) (0.425) 
High School GPA squared 0.430** 0.459** 0.383** 0.319** 0.256** 0.351** 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.065) (0.072) (0.078) (0.067) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent 0.168** 0.150** 0.064 0.047 0.032 0.073+ 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.043) (0.048) (0.042) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent squared -0.004** -0.003** -0.001+ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ACT English Score Equivalent 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.016 0.026 0.009 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.035) (0.038) (0.033) 
ACT English Score Equivalent squared -0.001 -0.001+ -0.001+ -0.001+ -0.002+ -0.001+ 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Observations 35,281 31,209 27,392 23,658 19,925 27,389 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income squared, AP credit, AP credit squared, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer 
hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 13b. Graduation with Missing Data & Imputation for Academic Background; No HS GPA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 0.324** 0.239* 0.295* 0.392** 0.594** 0.501** 
 (0.102) (0.103) (0.114) (0.132) (0.155) (0.120) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent 0.195** 0.140** 0.073* 0.049 0.056 0.090** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.034) (0.038) (0.032) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent squared -0.004** -0.003** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ACT English Score Equivalent 0.011 0.034 0.045+ 0.042 0.053+ 0.043+ 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) 
ACT English Score Equivalent squared -0.001+ -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Observations 44,507 39,376 34,465 29,650 24,894 34,462 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income squared, AP credit, AP credit squared, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer 
hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 13c. Graduation with Missing Data & Imputation for Academic Background; No HS GPA or Test Scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 0.246** 0.244** 0.288** 0.336** 0.466** 0.464** 
 (0.065) (0.069) (0.075) (0.084) (0.096) (0.078) 
       
Observations 65,125 57,731 50,611 43,601 36,660 50,608 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income squared, AP credit, AP credit squared, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer 
hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 13d. Graduation with Missing Data & Imputation for Academic Background; No HS GPA or Test Scores, with sample from full 
model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 0.354* 0.135 0.134 0.146 0.356 0.403* 
 (0.152) (0.146) (0.163) (0.187) (0.216) (0.173) 
       
Observations 29,803 26,318 23,096 19,952 16,818 23,104 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income squared, AP credit, AP credit squared, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer 
hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 13e. Graduation with Missing Data & Imputation for Academic Background; Full (MICE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 0.245** 0.251** 0.301** 0.348** 0.478** 0.520** 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.076) (0.084) (0.096) (0.087) 
High School GPA -0.778** -1.013** -0.986** -0.924** -0.834** -0.788** 
 (0.195) (0.200) (0.221) (0.242) (0.282) (0.241) 
High School GPA squared 0.134** 0.179** 0.178** 0.168** 0.154** 0.143** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.037) (0.040) (0.047) (0.040) 
ACT Math Equivalent 0.170** 0.127** 0.080** 0.060* 0.062+ 0.075* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) 
ACT Math Equivalent squared -0.004** -0.003** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001+ 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ACT English Equivalent 0.005 0.021 0.024 0.022 0.016 0.006 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
ACT English Equivalent squared -0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001+ -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Observations 65,125 57,731 50,611 43,601 36,660 43,601 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income squared, AP credit, AP credit squared, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer 
hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 13f. Graduation with Missing Data & Imputation for Academic Background; Full (Crude Imputation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 0.262** 0.263** 0.306** 0.352** 0.482** 0.481** 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.075) (0.084) (0.096) (0.078) 
Missing High School GPA -4.967** -4.032** -3.212** -2.389** -1.660* -2.643** 
 (0.564) (0.556) (0.590) (0.643) (0.692) (0.594) 
High School GPA -3.360** -2.908** -2.430** -1.931** -1.476** -2.021** 
 (0.355) (0.353) (0.377) (0.413) (0.446) (0.383) 
High School GPA squared 0.533** 0.485** 0.420** 0.344** 0.276** 0.349** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.059) (0.065) (0.071) (0.061) 
Missing ACT Math Score Equivalent 1.889** 1.584** 0.991** 0.753* 0.852* 1.188** 
 (0.313) (0.312) (0.336) (0.367) (0.404) (0.348) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent 0.216** 0.172** 0.113** 0.092** 0.097** 0.127** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.032) (0.035) (0.030) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent squared -0.005** -0.004** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Missing ACT English Score Equivalent 0.005 0.203 0.262 0.204 0.247 0.250 
 (0.240) (0.243) (0.261) (0.285) (0.311) (0.268) 
ACT English Score Equivalent 0.020 0.053* 0.061** 0.055* 0.060* 0.053* 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) 
ACT English Score Equivalent squared -0.001* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Observations 65,125 57,731 50,611 43,601 36,660 50,608 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income squared, AP credit, AP credit squared, grants, loans, scholarships, transfer hours, transfer 
hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA, age at matriculation, term of entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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4.6 Conclusion  
Student veterans at GSU hold characteristics that predict they will be less 
successful students. Yet, veterans are at least as successful as nonveteran students at GSU 
on all measures besides first year GPA. At least for retention and graduation, these 
findings corroborate the student veteran paradox and rule out the bias explanation. When 
controlling for background characteristics, enrollment behaviors, age of entry, and 
institutional changes over time, veterans have lower grades after the first year, but are 
more likely to return in the second year and to eventually graduate. Veterans have lower 
mean first-year grades than nonveterans, but this is partly because veterans are older and, 
surprisingly, older students earn higher grades. The veteran advantage in retention and 
graduation persists even after controlling for background characteristics and age of entry, 
though some of the advantage is due to higher full time enrollment and more transfer 
credit. Enrollment patterns help explain the veteran advantage in retention and 
graduation, but limitations in past research, background characteristics, and age at 
matriculation do not.  
Controlling for enrollment patterns does not completely explain the student 
veteran paradox for retention and graduation. Compared with similar nonveterans, the 
probability of continuing past the first year is still 4 percentage points higher for a veteran 
and the probability of graduating is between 5 and 9 percentage points higher for a 
veteran. This suggests that the veteran advantage is also due to GI Bill aid, unobserved 
factors associated with selection, or the direct effects of military service. In the next 
chapter, I report the results of the secondary analyses that build on the primary models 
and test these explanations for the veteran paradox. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS FROM SECONDARY MODELS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This dissertation has presented seven competing explanations that can resolve the 
student veteran paradox: bias in past research, background characteristics of veterans, 
enrollment behaviors of veterans, maturation from delayed entry, education aid benefits 
for veterans, unobservable factors associated with selection into the military, or direct 
effects of military service. For retention and graduation, the previous chapter ruled out 
the bias, background, and maturation explanations, but found support for the enrollment 
explanation. Even after controlling for enrollment patterns like part-time status and 
transfer hours, though, veterans are more likely to return for the second year and are more 
likely to graduate. This suggests that the veteran paradox is, in part, due to at least one of 
the remaining explanations: the education aid, unobservable factors associated with 
selection, or direct effects of military service. I examine these explanations in this 
chapter.  
I test the aid explanation with two variations on the primary models. First, I assess 
outcomes for veterans using different types of GI Bill benefits and for nonveterans using 
veteran survivor/dependent benefits. Second, I assess outcomes for a subset of veterans 
who have GI Bill award amount data available. If aid explains the veteran paradox, then 
outcomes should be better for veterans using the more generous version of the GI Bill, for 
veteran survivors and dependents, and for veterans with higher GI Bill awards. Although 
aid explains some of the veteran advantage in retention and graduation, it does not 
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account for all of it. Additionally, aid levels seem to have little impact on first year 
grades. 
I test the selection and direct effects explanations by repeating the primary models 
after matching veterans to similar nonveterans. The matching approach can compensate 
for misspecifications in the primary models and can account for selection on the 
observables. Additionally, it can also account for selection on the unobservables but only 
if the unobservables are correlated with the observables and the correlations do not differ 
for veterans and nonveterans. These are strong assumptions that are impossible to verify. 
If selection explains the veteran paradox and the observables can predict the 
unobservables, then the effects of veteran status on retention and graduation will diminish 
or vanish after matching. If the direct effects of military service are driving the veteran 
paradox, then the effects of veteran status will remain or even increase after matching. 
Veterans still have lower grades than similar matched nonveterans, but the veterans are 
more likely to return after the first year and are more likely to graduate. The retention and 
graduation effects are generally slightly higher than those from the primary models in the 
previous chapter. These results after matching are consistent with the direct effects 
explanation. However, the selection explanation cannot be ruled out completely. 
 
5.2 Student Success Outcomes for Students with Military Education Benefits 
 
I test the funding explanation with two variations on the primary models: 
H5: Students with higher levels of veteran education benefits tend to have  
better student success outcomes than otherwise similar students 
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The two approaches used here examine how levels of military education benefits 
impact student success. The first repeats the primary models but adds two terms to 
identify veterans using the more generous Post-9/11 GI Bill (those that upgrade and those 
that use it exclusively). It also includes a dummy variable to identify the survivors and 
dependents of veterans. The second repeats the primary models with the small subset of 
veterans who have GI Bill payment amounts. If funding is driving the veteran paradox, 
then outcomes should be better for veterans using the more generous Post-9/11 GI Bill, 
for veteran survivors and dependents (who are nonveterans who receive veteran aid 
without military service), and for veterans with higher amounts of GI Bill payments. 
Some caution is warranted for the results of the aid analyses. These two analyses 
are dividing the already-small veteran population into even smaller subpopulations. 
Veteran dependents, who were not classified as veterans in the earlier analyses, are also a 
small group. These small group sizes lead to high standard errors in many cases.17 
Additionally, having certain aid types or levels may be related to other unobserved traits. 
Veterans who used older forms of the GI Bill were required to make contributions while 
enlisted, so they may have stronger intentions toward earning a degree. Veterans using 
the Post-9/11 GI Bill receive a pro-rated award if they serve for less than three years, so 
higher levels of funding might be associated with perseverance.  
  
                                                        
17 The large standard errors stem from the low variance of the independent variables. For 
example, there are fewer than 150 veterans in the entire dataset who upgrade their GI Bill 
and fewer than 50 who do so in their first year. Thus, the variance is very low for the 
convert dummy variables, which causes large standard errors. 
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5.2.1 Aid Type 
I use the primary models but add two new variables to identify veterans who 
upgraded from the older GI Bill to the newer Post-9/11 GI Bill, and veterans who 
exclusively use the Post-9/11 GI Bill. These variables show the impact of upgrading to or 
exclusively using the Post-9/11 GI Bill beyond the effect of being a veteran. I also add a 
dummy variable for nonveterans who use veteran survivor/dependent benefits. Table 14 
shows the results. Since the Post-9/11 GI Bill variables are essentially interaction terms, 
those coefficients show the effects for those veterans in addition to the effects of the 
veteran variable. 
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Table 14. Aid Levels and Student Success, Average Partial Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES First Year 
GPA 
First Year 
Retention 
4 Year 
Graduation 
5 Year 
Graduation 
6 Year 
Graduation 
      
Veteran -0.167** 3.6** 4.7** 4.8** 5.6** 
 (0.025) (1.3) (1.6) (1.7) (1.6) 
Only Uses Post-9/11 GI Bill 0.030 -0.0 -0.3 -1.5 -4.1 
 (0.034) (1.9) (2.3) (2.8) (3.3) 
Converts to Post-9/11 GI Bill (first year) -0.333* 8.6    
 (0.148) (8.0)    
Converts to Post-9/11 GI Bill (ever)   0.3 7.6+ 8.5* 
   (4.0) (4.3) (4.2) 
      
Veteran Survivor/Dependent -0.034 5.8** 1.9 4.2+ 3.5 
 (0.031) (1.7) (2.1) (2.3) (2.5) 
      
Observations 70,893 86,416 65,125 57,731 50,611 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income squared, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, AP 
credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score equivalent, ACT math score equivalent squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT 
English score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, scholarships, 
transfer hours, transfer hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA (graduation models only), age at matriculation, term of 
entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Consistent with the primary models from the previous chapter, veterans have 
lower first year GPAs, but higher retention and graduation probabilities than comparable 
nonveterans. Veterans who only use the Post-9/11 GI Bill have virtually the same 
outcomes as other veterans. Surprisingly, veterans who begin using an older form of the 
GI Bill and upgrade to the Post-9/11 GI Bill have first year GPAs a third of a grade lower 
than other similar veterans who exclusively used the older GI Bill, but have probabilities 
of graduating within six years 8.5 percentage points higher than similar veterans using the 
older GI Bill (and thus, 14.1 percentage points higher than similar nonveterans).  
The survivors and dependents of veterans are nonveterans who receive veteran aid 
without military service. As such, they can help isolate the effects of the aid. Survivors 
and dependents have first year grades and graduation probabilities similar to comparable 
nonveterans, but have a probability of returning after the first year 5.8 percentage points 
higher. Although this is higher than the veteran advantage in retention, it is not 
significantly different. 
 
5.2.2 Aid Amount 
I use the primary models with the subset of Post-9/11 GI Bill recipients with 
payment data, dropping the veteran dummy variable and adding a continuous measure of 
GI Bill aid. Table 15 shows the results. 
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Table 15. Aid Levels and Student Success Among Post-9/11 Veterans, Average Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES First Year 
GPA 
First Year 
Retention 
Four Year 
Graduation 
Five Year 
Graduation 
     
GI Bill Awards (first-semester, in $1,000s) -0.022 2.9* -0.9 27.0** 
 (0.023) (1.4) (2.7) (9.4) 
     
Observations 556 669 310 156 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income squared, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, AP 
credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score equivalent, ACT math score equivalent squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT 
English score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, scholarships, 
transfer hours, transfer hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA (graduation models only), age at matriculation, term of 
entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Among Post-9/11 veterans, the GI Bill payments appear to have no relationship 
with grades. However, levels of GI Bill payments are associated with higher retention 
and graduation rates. For similar veterans using the Post-9/11 GI Bill, an extra $1,000 in 
veteran benefits increases the probability of returning for the second year by 2.9 
percentage points and the probability of graduating within five years by 27 percentage 
points. Levels of benefits appear to have no effect on the probability of graduating within 
four years. There isn’t enough data to construct a six-year graduation model and low 
sample sizes may affect other estimates.18 
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
Overall, the results from these analyses suggest that aid partially explains the 
veteran paradox for retention and graduation. Like veterans, the survivors and dependents 
of veterans who receive education benefits are more likely to return after the first year 
than other similar nonveterans. Veterans who start college using the GI Bill and then 
receive increased benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill are more likely to graduate within 
six years than other comparable veterans. Among Post-9/11 veterans with award data, 
larger GI bill payments are associated with higher probabilities of returning after the first 
year and graduating within five years. 
Yet, these results suggest that veteran aid does not fully explain the veteran 
advantage in retention and graduation. Veterans who exclusively use the more generous 
Post-9/11 GI Bill are no more likely to return and graduate than other similar veterans. 
Moreover, veteran survivors and dependents have essentially the same chances of 
                                                        
18 Award amounts vary based on the amount of time served after 9/11. 
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graduating as other, similar nonveterans. It could be the case that generous eligibility 
might induce college enrollment for those veterans and veteran survivors/dependents who 
are unsuited for it. The models control for academic background, but some unobservable 
factors could be relevant. On the whole, education benefits for veterans seem to have 
negligible impacts on grades but seem to improve retention and graduation. However, 
these still do not fully explain the veteran paradox in retention and, especially, 
graduation. 
 
5.3 Student Success Outcomes for Veterans and Matched Nonveterans 
I test the selection and direct effects explanations by repeating the primary models 
after matching: 
H6: Veterans have worse student success outcomes than nonveterans  
who match characteristics associated with enlistment 
H7: Veterans have student success outcomes at least as good as nonveterans  
after controlling for all the aforementioned factors 
The approach used here relies on matching to create a comparison group of 
nonveterans who are most similar to the veterans. To create the matched comparison 
group, I use variables related to veteran status and student success, but exclude variables 
that could be affected by veteran status. This includes sex, race, socioeconomic status, 
academic background, age, and geographic military presence.19 As is generally 
                                                        
19 Although some suggest that variables related to the treatment but unrelated to the 
outcome should be excluded from the matching procedure, this practice is generally 
acceptable as long as including the variable does not lead to unbalanced groups. Using 
geographic military presence did not disrupt the balance. 
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recommended, I include the dummy variables that identify students with imputed values 
for the academic background variables. 
Recommendations vary on how to select a matching method, but many suggest 
choosing the method that achieves the best balance among the important covariates. I 
create matched comparison groups using the most commonly recommended approaches. 
Table 16 shows the standardized differences between veterans and nonveterans for each 
of the matching approaches. As shown in the previous chapter, there are very substantial 
differences between veterans and nonveterans in the unmatched data. Each of the 
matching methods improves the balance between veterans and nonveterans. Standardized 
differences above 20 are typically seen as problematic. Only kernel matching produced 
differences that exceeded this threshold. 
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Table 16. Standardized Differences Between Veterans and Nonveterans Before and After Matching 
          
VARIABLES Unmatched PS 1:1 NN PS k:1 NN PS Kernel Mahalanobis 
          
Female -43.0 -0.7 -1.0 -12.7 -4.6 
Race      
     Black 24.3 0.1 -1.0 8.6 -0.6 
     Hispanic 2.6 -3.4 0.0 1.0 0.5 
     Asian -3.0 1.7 0.0 -13.9 0.6 
     Other/Biracial 3.7 2.4 0.8 1.7 0.2 
     No Race Given -1.6 4.2 3.0 0.4 0.2 
Mean ZIP Income -18.4 -4.0 -1.2 -6.6 1.0 
High School GPA -64.4 0.1 -0.4 -22.4 0.2 
Missing High School GPA 62.1 -0.1 0.4 21.4 -0.4 
AP Credit -31.0 1.8 1.2 -12.7 1.3 
ACT Math Score Equivalent -50.6 4.1 4.5 -17.6 -0.2 
Missing ACT Math Score Equivalent 44.9 -4.3 -5.0 15.1 0.1 
ACT English Score Equivalent -50.2 2.0 3.1 -17.0 0.0 
Missing ACT English Score Equivalent 50.2 -2.4 -3.2 16.9 0.0 
Age at Matriculation 68.3 5.3 2.4 23.8 0.1 
Recruitment Density 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.1 2.0 
      
Overall Mean Difference 17.1 2.1 1.5 6.2 0.2 
      
Observations 94,635 5,036 9,445 94,264 4,032 
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Matching methods involve a trade-off between bias and variance, since adding 
multiple matches per veteran will increase the size of the comparison group but at the risk 
of adding nonveterans who are less similar to veterans on the relevant variables. As such, 
I chose propensity score matching using four nearest neighbors with replacement. 
Although Mahalanobis matching makes the two groups most similar, it comes at the cost 
of a smaller comparison group. The propensity score nearest neighbors approach strikes 
the best balance between bias and variance, as it yields very similar groups but with a 
much larger comparison group.20 
Table 17 shows the results of the primary models on the preprocessed sample. 
Veterans have predicted first year GPAs .15 lower than comparable, matched 
nonveterans. Veterans are more likely to return after the first year and to eventually 
graduate. Compared with similar nonveterans from the matched sample, the predicted 
retention probability is 5.1 percentage points higher for veterans and the predicted 
graduation probability is between 5.0 and 8.2 percentage points higher for veterans.21 The 
results after matching are very similar to those using the unmatched data presented in the 
previous chapter. The effect is nearly identical for first year GPA and is about one and a 
half percentage points higher for retention. The effects are generally between half and 
one percentage point higher for graduation, but are slightly lower in the seven- and eight-
year models.
                                                        
20 I also performed the subsequent analysis after Mahalanobis matching and the results 
were nearly identical to those presented here. 
21 Technically, the standard errors used in these regressions are incorrect because they are 
used in second-stage regressions and do not account for the first stage (in which the 
propensity scores were estimated). I also compute the adjusted AI standard errors in Stata 
and use them to manually recalculate the p-values. All estimates are at least statistically 
significant at the .05 level. 
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Table 17. Student Success Regressions on Matched Sample, Average Partial Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES First Year 
GPA 
First Year 
Retention 
4 Year 
Graduation 
5 Year 
Graduation 
6 Year 
Graduation 
7 Year 
Graduation 
8 Year 
Graduation 
Ever 
Graduates 
         
Veteran -0.149** 5.1** 5.0** 5.5** 6.2** 5.8** 7.0** 8.2** 
 (0.023) (1.2) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.8) (2.0) (1.6) 
         
Observations 6,962 8,685 6,423 5,692 4,956 4,173 3,471 4,953 
Standard errors in parentheses. Models also include the following variables: female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Other/Biracial, no race 
given, mean ZIP income, mean ZIP income squared, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, missing high school GPA, AP 
credit, AP credit squared, ACT math score equivalent, ACT math score equivalent squared, missing ACT math score equivalent, ACT 
English score equivalent, ACT English score equivalent squared, missing ACT English score equivalent, grants, loans, scholarships, 
transfer hours, transfer hours squared, part time student, first semester GPA (graduation models only), age at matriculation, term of 
entry. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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5.3.1 Discussion 
Even after taking into account the support for the enrollment and aid explanations, 
the veteran paradox still remains, especially for graduation. This leaves the selection and 
direct effects explanations. The results from propensity score matching cannot 
completely rule out the selection explanation. The factors associated with selection are 
unobserved here, which makes it very difficult to control for them. If the unobservables 
are correlated with the observed variables used here, and if those correlations are 
equivalent for veterans and nonveterans, then the propensity score matching analysis has 
controlled for them. However, these assumptions, while not implausible, are strong and 
are impossible to verify.  
Past research has shown that military enlistment is associated with social 
isolation, histories of adolescent fighting, weaker family structures, greater geographic 
military institutional presence, lower socioeconomic status, weaker academic 
backgrounds, but also with higher education aspirations (Kleykamp, 2006; Elder et al., 
2010; Spence, Henderson, and Elder, 2013; Teachman and Tedrow, 2014). On the whole, 
these findings suggest that the relevant unobservables are more likely to inhibit student 
success than bolster it. Together, the enlistment literature, logic, and the matching results 
suggest that the selection explanation is unlikely to be driving the veteran paradox for 
retention and graduation. However, it cannot be ruled out completely.  
The results of the matching analysis are consistent with the direct effects 
explanation. Even though the threat of selection cannot be eliminated, past research and 
the matching results suggest that the direct effects explanation is more likely. Although 
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far from conclusive, on the whole this suggests that actual military service leads to better 
student success outcomes. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The results from the previous chapter ruled out the bias, background, and 
maturation explanations for the veteran paradox, but found support for the enrollment 
explanation. The findings from this chapter assess the aid, selection, and direct effects 
explanations. The results suggest that aid partially explains the veteran paradox for 
retention and for graduation. The matching results cannot completely rule out the 
selection explanation, but suggest that it is unlikely. Overall, the results from all the 
previous analyses (and, especially, the final matching analysis), suggest that the effects of 
actually serving in the military partially explain the veteran paradox for retention and 
graduation. In the final chapter, I discuss additional implications of these results and 
directions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand how veterans fare in college and 
why those outcomes manifest themselves. Theory and related evidence predict that 
veteran students should be less successful than their nonveteran peers, yet the limited past 
research suggests that they are actually at least as successful as, if not more successful 
than, nonveterans. This is the student veteran paradox. I have proposed and tested seven 
potential explanations to resolve this paradox: bias in past research, background 
characteristics of veterans, enrollment behaviors of veterans, maturation from delayed 
entry, education aid benefits for veterans, unobservable factors associated with selection 
into the military, or the direct effects of military service.  
The descriptive statistics for both groups show that veterans do hold 
characteristics that inhibit success, but are at least as successful as nonveterans in 
retention and graduation (but not first year grades). The primary models show this is 
partly due to enrollment patterns, but not background characteristics or simple 
maturation. Veterans at GSU begin with more transfer credit and, surprisingly, are less 
likely to enroll part-time. Still, veterans are more likely to return for the second year and 
to eventually graduate than similar nonveterans, even when controlling for enrollment 
behaviors. The results from the funding analyses suggest that part, but not all, of this can 
be attributed to education aid benefits. The matching results seem to suggest that another 
part stems from the direct consequences of military service. However, the findings could 
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not completely rule out the possibility that the veteran advantage is due to unobservable 
factors that are associated with enlisting in the military. Overall, at least for retention and 
graduation, these results rule out the bias, background characteristics, and maturation 
explanations, but support the enrollment patterns and funding explanations. The results 
are consistent with the direct effects explanation, but the selection explanation cannot be 
ruled out completely.  
 
6.2 Limitations 
This dissertation makes several original contributions, but is limited in many 
respects. The conclusions from the primary models are strong, but those from the 
secondary models are much more weakly supported. The funding analyses rely on very 
small subgroups of veterans. More significantly, the selection explanation could not be 
adequately ruled out. Controlling for unobservable factors associated with selection is 
very difficult under optimal circumstances. There are no strong instrumental variables for 
contemporary veterans. The matching approach used only controls for unobservables if 
they are correlated with the observables. This is impossible to assess. 
There are also external validity issues related to Georgia State University. Despite 
attempts to expand the study, data only included students at a single university. GSU has 
actively worked to improve retention and graduation in the past decade. Even though the 
models control for term of entry, it is possible that interventions have disproportionately 
affected veteran students. Even if this isn’t the case, GSU could be different on other 
dimensions or could be an anomaly for veteran success.  
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6.3 Policy Implications 
The results from this dissertation have many implications for public policy. First, 
this research suggests that veteran education benefits are not being wasted, at least when 
used at institutions like GSU. Some recent media reports claim that veterans squander 
these resources because they drop out of college at much higher rates than nonveterans 
(e.g., Betar 2012, Briggs 2012, Wood 2012). At least at GSU, this is far from the case.  
Many states have either implemented performance-based funding models for 
public colleges and universities or are considering it. Under such systems, the state 
appropriation a college receives is determined, at least in part, by institutional 
performance on student retention and graduation. These systems typically have 
mechanisms in the formulae to prevent disincentives for enrolling high-risk students (e.g., 
first-generation students and minority students). Some states have considered adding 
veterans to these protected groups, but the results of this research suggest that is 
unnecessary.  
This research also implies that changing enrollment patterns is one way to 
improve the graduation and retention. Part of the reason veterans fare well is because 
they are much less likely to enroll part-time, and part-time student fare worse. This is 
perhaps an indirect effect of GI Bill benefits, if they allow veterans to delay work in order 
to enroll full-time. Although the findings on part-time students are not new, the overall 
results serve as a reminder that these patterns are malleable and altering them could 
improve outcomes for students. Colleges could encourage full-time attendance or 
beginning at a two-year institute in various ways, through information or with financial 
incentives (e.g., aid, tuition discounts, etc.). 
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At the ground level, many colleges and universities have limited resources. Many 
argue that programs centered on veteran student support should be high priorities. 
Although it is important to provide adequate support for veteran students (particularly in 
mental health), the results of this work suggest that extensive programs for veterans may 
not be necessary. In a world of scarce resources, institutional funds for support programs 
would be more useful if targeted toward higher risk groups. 
 
6.4 Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation makes several original contributions, but it also raises additional 
questions to be addressed in the future research. Most importantly, additional research 
should examine outcomes for veteran students beyond Georgia State University. 
Although the university is not unique in its support for veterans or in the size of the 
veteran population, external validity is not addressed in this study. GSU has improved 
graduation rates over the past decade; although this study does control for institutional 
change over time, veterans could be less successful at other institutions. Research should 
look particularly at veteran success at for-profit colleges, which take in a disproportionate 
amount of money spent on veteran education benefits.  
This study finds support for the explanation that military service improves the 
odds of retention and graduation. Yet this raises questions about the specific 
mechanism(s) of action through which this occurs. Past research has suggested that non-
cognitive factors such as resilience and grit are associated with graduation. Many 
contemporary soldiers go through resilience training programs during service, and 
veterans report that service improves independence, self-discipline, and ability to deal 
  139 
with adversity (Meredith et al., 2011; Elder and Clipp, 1989). Additionally, grit has been 
associated with both college graduation and persistence through military training 
(Duckworth et al., 2007; Maddi et al., 2012; Eskreis-Winkler et al. 2014). Alternatively, 
improved performance could be a policy feedback effect. Mettler (2002) finds that GI 
Bill usage increased civic engagement among WWII veterans, postulating that this might 
stem from a sense of obligation from receiving those benefits. Analogously, student 
veterans might work harder out of a sense of obligation from receiving various veteran 
benefits. Future research should focus on whether veteran and nonveteran students differ 
on these various non-cognitive factors and whether they can account for the direct effects 
of military service on retention and graduation.  
One of the major shortcomings of this research is the inability to rule out 
unobservable factors related to selection into the military. Additional causal inference 
work should aim to address the selection explanation. Unfortunately, this is a difficult 
task. There are no apparent strong instruments that could address this for contemporary 
veterans. Longitudinal datasets that capture these factors during high school may hold 
promise. 
Moreover, additional research should investigate other things that mediate the 
relationships between veteran status and student success outcomes. Postsecondary 
institutions vary widely in programs, policies, and resources devoted to veteran students. 
These may improve veteran experiences on campus, but researchers should examine 
whether they have any impact on student success outcomes for veterans.  
More generally, education researchers should expand research beyond first-time, 
full-time students who enter in the fall. Most research focuses on this subpopulation 
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because these are the students included in required data submissions to the Department of 
Education, and, subsequently, are the students included in the publicly-available datasets. 
This epitomizes the research joke about only looking for car keys under the streetlamp. 
Simplifying samples to first-time, full-time, fall entrants eases many analyses, but it 
excludes the majority of students who attend institutions like GSU. Although findings for 
veterans in this analysis were consistent, student success outcomes for minorities were 
less favorable when using an unrestricted sample of all students. The federal government 
should require data reporting for all students, but until that happens researchers should 
also strive to find datasets that are representative of actual student bodies. Doing so will 
not only prevent biased findings, but also improve the policy recommendations they 
inspire. Institutional research offices are obvious data sources, as are statewide data 
systems that are (usually) more complete.  
Additionally, education researchers should focus on adding nuance to the 
relationships between student success outcomes. The conventional narrative is that 
earning good grades is necessary for first year retention, and that both grades and 
retention are necessary for graduation. This is obviously true, but the results from this 
dissertation suggest that the relationships are complex. Veterans have lower first-year 
grades than comparable nonveterans, but are more likely to return and graduate. 
Similarly, minority students have lower grades and higher retention rates than 
comparable whites, but only Asians have higher graduation rates while all other races 
graduate at virtually the same rates as similar white students. On the whole, findings like 
this suggest that factors and interventions that improve the leading measures of success 
may not influence the lagging measures in the same ways. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 18. First Year GPA, Full Regression Results 
   
VARIABLES   
   
Veteran -0.155** (0.017) 
Female 0.089** (0.005) 
Race   
     Black -0.270** (0.007) 
     Hispanic -0.087** (0.010) 
     Asian -0.098** (0.009) 
     Other/Biracial -0.151** (0.014) 
     No Race Given -0.100** (0.013) 
Mean ZIP Income (in $10,000s) 0.018** (0.004) 
Mean ZIP Income squared -0.001** (0.000) 
High School GPA -0.951** (0.098) 
High School GPA squared 0.223** (0.015) 
Missing High School GPA -0.778** (0.155) 
AP Credit 0.024** (0.001) 
AP Credit squared -0.001** (0.000) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent 0.084** (0.007) 
ACT Math Equivalent squared -0.002** (0.000) 
Missing ACT Math Score Equivalent 0.993** (0.082) 
ACT English Score Equivalent 0.062** (0.006) 
ACT English Equivalent squared -0.001** (0.000) 
Missing ACT English Score Equivalent 0.789** (0.063) 
Grants (first-semester, in $1,000s) -0.037** (0.002) 
Loans (first-semester, in $1,000s) -0.024** (0.001) 
Scholarships (first-semester, in $1,000s) 0.092** (0.002) 
Transfer Hours 0.002** (0.000) 
Transfer Hours squared 0.000** (0.000) 
Part-Time Student (first-year) -0.328** (0.006) 
Age at Matriculation   
     13 0.146 (0.667) 
     14 0.343 (0.252) 
     15 0.214** (0.079) 
     16 0.141** (0.033) 
     17 0.044** (0.012) 
     19 0.029** (0.010) 
     20 0.055** (0.013) 
     21 0.069** (0.014) 
     22 0.135** (0.016) 
     23 0.215** (0.018) 
     24 0.278** (0.019) 
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     25 0.365** (0.021) 
     26 0.341** (0.022) 
     27 0.382** (0.023) 
     28 0.431** (0.025) 
     29 0.478** (0.027) 
     30 0.511** (0.028) 
     31 0.552** (0.028) 
     32 0.532** (0.030) 
     33 0.491** (0.031) 
     34 0.509** (0.033) 
     35 0.536** (0.034) 
     36 0.569** (0.038) 
     37 0.484** (0.038) 
     38 0.620** (0.040) 
     39 0.545** (0.041) 
     40 0.519** (0.045) 
     41 0.585** (0.042) 
     42 0.600** (0.047) 
     43 0.591** (0.052) 
     44 0.652** (0.055) 
     45 0.712** (0.054) 
     46 0.589** (0.056) 
     47 0.607** (0.061) 
     48 0.626** (0.068) 
     49 0.626** (0.069) 
     50 0.603** (0.071) 
     51 0.454** (0.086) 
     52 0.638** (0.083) 
     53 0.625** (0.085) 
     54 0.503** (0.093) 
     55 0.559** (0.103) 
     56 0.298** (0.113) 
     57 0.765** (0.129) 
     58 0.782** (0.143) 
     59 0.721** (0.153) 
     60 0.520** (0.201) 
     61 0.475* (0.236) 
     62 0.530** (0.112) 
     63 0.540** (0.146) 
     64 0.469** (0.150) 
     65 0.466** (0.167) 
     66 0.601+ (0.333) 
     67 0.691** (0.211) 
     68 0.675** (0.202) 
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     69 0.056 (0.472) 
     70 0.133 (0.333) 
     71 0.482 (0.385) 
     72 0.209 (0.472) 
     73 0.844 (0.667) 
     74 -0.126 (0.667) 
     75 0.441 (0.668) 
     76 0.735 (0.472) 
     79 -0.418 (0.667) 
     81 0.337 (0.667) 
     85 1.414* (0.667) 
Term of Entry   
     Spring 2004 -0.055* (0.023) 
     Summer 2004 0.031 (0.030) 
     Fall 2004 0.010 (0.016) 
     Spring 2005 0.062** (0.024) 
     Summer 2005 0.031 (0.032) 
     Fall 2005 -0.009 (0.016) 
     Spring 2006 -0.004 (0.022) 
     Summer 2006 -0.023 (0.030) 
     Fall 2006 -0.010 (0.016) 
     Spring 2007 0.039+ (0.022) 
     Summer 2007 0.009 (0.031) 
     Fall 2007 0.015 (0.015) 
     Spring 2008 0.057* (0.023) 
     Summer 2008 0.129** (0.030) 
     Fall 2008 0.085** (0.015) 
     Spring 2009 0.085** (0.022) 
     Summer 2009 0.110** (0.031) 
     Fall 2009 0.083** (0.015) 
     Spring 2010 0.069** (0.021) 
     Summer 2010 0.080* (0.031) 
     Fall 2010 0.056** (0.015) 
     Spring 2011 0.123** (0.022) 
     Summer 2011 0.184** (0.031) 
     Fall 2011 0.112** (0.015) 
     Spring 2012 0.144** (0.022) 
     Summer 2012 0.171** (0.029) 
     Fall 2012 0.156** (0.015) 
     Spring 2013 0.125** (0.022) 
     Summer 2013 0.147** (0.029) 
     Fall 2013 0.210** (0.015) 
     Spring 2014 0.156** (0.023) 
     Summer 2014 0.154** (0.028) 
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     Fall 2014 0.183** (0.015) 
     Spring 2015 0.177** (0.024) 
Constant 1.524** (0.176) 
   
Observations 70,893  
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 19. First-Year Retention, Full Regression Results 
   
VARIABLES   
   
Veteran 0.220** (0.057) 
Female -0.037* (0.018) 
Race   
     Black 0.189** (0.022) 
     Hispanic 0.314** (0.036) 
     Asian 0.546** (0.034) 
     Other/Biracial 0.226** (0.047) 
     No Race Given -0.412** (0.035) 
Mean ZIP Income (in $10,000s) 0.071** (0.012) 
Mean ZIP Income squared -0.003** (0.001) 
High School GPA -0.805* (0.317) 
High School GPA squared 0.104* (0.050) 
Missing High School GPA -1.313** (0.499) 
AP Credit 0.070** (0.005) 
AP Credit squared -0.002** (0.000) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent 0.250** (0.023) 
ACT Math Equivalent squared -0.005** (0.000) 
Missing ACT Math Score Equivalent 2.314** (0.265) 
ACT English Score Equivalent 0.068** (0.019) 
ACT English Equivalent squared -0.002** (0.000) 
Missing ACT English Score Equivalent 0.531* (0.210) 
Grants (first-semester, in $1,000s) 0.071** (0.009) 
Loans (first-semester, in $1,000s) 0.020** (0.004) 
Scholarships (first-semester, in $1,000s) 0.212** (0.008) 
Transfer Hours 0.014** (0.001) 
Transfer Hours squared -0.000** (0.000) 
Part-Time Student (first-year) -0.452** (0.019) 
Age at Matriculation   
     13, omitted -  
     14, omitted -  
     15 0.713* (0.293) 
     16 0.067 (0.097) 
     17 -0.398** (0.038) 
     19 -0.101** (0.034) 
     20 -0.033 (0.042) 
     21 -0.033 (0.047) 
     22 -0.008 (0.052) 
     23 -0.188** (0.055) 
     24 -0.308** (0.058) 
     25 -0.213** (0.062) 
     26 -0.232** (0.066) 
     27 -0.227** (0.069) 
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     28 -0.317** (0.072) 
     29 -0.309** (0.078) 
     30 -0.061 (0.082) 
     31 -0.089 (0.085) 
     32 -0.118 (0.089) 
     33 -0.245** (0.089) 
     34 -0.131 (0.097) 
     35 -0.215* (0.099) 
     36 -0.352** (0.107) 
     37 -0.314** (0.107) 
     38 -0.044 (0.118) 
     39 -0.212+ (0.116) 
     40 -0.110 (0.131) 
     41 0.037 (0.125) 
     42 -0.076 (0.137) 
     43 -0.137 (0.142) 
     44 0.054 (0.159) 
     45 0.077 (0.160) 
     46 -0.082 (0.161) 
     47 -0.146 (0.175) 
     48 0.040 (0.194) 
     49 -0.115 (0.198) 
     50 -0.171 (0.201) 
     51 0.036 (0.236) 
     52 -0.312 (0.220) 
     53 -0.497* (0.217) 
     54 -0.050 (0.259) 
     55 0.392 (0.322) 
     56 0.079 (0.332) 
     57 0.321 (0.382) 
     58 -0.331 (0.388) 
     59 -0.128 (0.435) 
     60 -0.963+ (0.493) 
     61 -0.177 (0.602) 
     62 0.143 (0.297) 
     63 0.296 (0.382) 
     64 0.467 (0.418) 
     65 -0.640 (0.405) 
     66 -1.735** (0.657) 
     67 -0.304 (0.566) 
     68 0.224 (0.505) 
     69 -1.721* (0.827) 
     70 0.903 (1.149) 
     71 -1.165 (0.887) 
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     72 -0.453 (1.006) 
     73 -1.237 (1.172) 
     74 -0.310 (1.429) 
     75, omitted -  
     76 -0.411 (1.019) 
     77, omitted -  
     79 -0.414 (1.307) 
     81, omitted -  
     83, omitted -  
     85, omitted -  
     88, omitted -  
     91, omitted -  
Term of Entry   
     Spring 2004 -0.272** (0.064) 
     Summer 2004 -0.468** (0.084) 
     Fall 2004 -0.183** (0.048) 
     Spring 2005 -0.158* (0.069) 
     Summer 2005 -0.125 (0.096) 
     Fall 2005 -0.029 (0.049) 
     Spring 2006 0.087 (0.070) 
     Summer 2006 -0.027 (0.092) 
     Fall 2006 0.071 (0.051) 
     Spring 2007 0.053 (0.069) 
     Summer 2007 -0.095 (0.093) 
     Fall 2007 0.046 (0.049) 
     Spring 2008 -0.087 (0.070) 
     Summer 2008 0.145 (0.096) 
     Fall 2008 0.128* (0.050) 
     Spring 2009 0.027 (0.069) 
     Summer 2009 -0.004 (0.096) 
     Fall 2009 0.081 (0.049) 
     Spring 2010 0.046 (0.068) 
     Summer 2010 -0.199* (0.095) 
     Fall 2010 -0.076 (0.049) 
     Spring 2011 -0.045 (0.069) 
     Summer 2011 -0.080 (0.097) 
     Fall 2011 0.010 (0.048) 
     Spring 2012 -0.116+ (0.069) 
     Summer 2012 -0.169+ (0.090) 
     Fall 2012 -0.074 (0.047) 
     Spring 2013 -0.173** (0.067) 
     Summer 2013 -0.087 (0.090) 
     Fall 2013 -0.096* (0.048) 
     Spring 2014 -0.214** (0.069) 
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     Summer 2014 0.139 (0.093) 
     Fall 2014 -0.114* (0.047) 
     Spring 2015 -0.105 (0.074) 
Constant -1.435* (0.559) 
   
Observations 86,416  
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 20. Graduation, Full Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year Ever 
       
Veteran 0.262** 0.263** 0.306** 0.352** 0.482** 0.481** 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.075) (0.084) (0.096) (0.078) 
Female 0.184** 0.175** 0.184** 0.179** 0.190** 0.220** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.023) 
Race       
     Black 0.057* 0.027 0.025 0.055+ 0.034 0.042 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.034) (0.029) 
     Hispanic -0.029 -0.018 -0.004 0.013 0.013 0.080+ 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.045) (0.050) (0.056) (0.048) 
     Asian 0.185** 0.214** 0.263** 0.301** 0.296** 0.257** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.043) (0.048) (0.042) 
     Other/Biracial -0.046 -0.151** -0.030 -0.011 -0.035 -0.046 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.063) (0.070) (0.078) (0.065) 
     No Race Given -0.124** -0.213** -0.285** -0.303** -0.342** -0.402** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) (0.052) (0.049) 
Mean ZIP Income (in $10,000s) 0.046** 0.081** 0.090** 0.103** 0.093** 0.083** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) 
Mean ZIP Income squared -0.002* -0.003** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
High School GPA -3.360** -2.908** -2.430** -1.931** -1.476** -2.021** 
 (0.355) (0.353) (0.377) (0.413) (0.446) (0.383) 
High School GPA squared 0.533** 0.485** 0.420** 0.344** 0.276** 0.349** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.059) (0.065) (0.071) (0.061) 
Missing High School GPA -4.967** -4.032** -3.212** -2.389** -1.660* -2.643** 
 (0.564) (0.556) (0.590) (0.643) (0.692) (0.594) 
AP Credit 0.060** 0.042** 0.037** 0.041** 0.047** 0.036** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
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AP Credit squared -0.002** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACT Math Score Equivalent 0.216** 0.172** 0.113** 0.092** 0.097** 0.127** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.032) (0.035) (0.030) 
ACT Math Equivalent squared -0.005** -0.004** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Missing ACT Math Score Equivalent 1.889** 1.584** 0.991** 0.753* 0.852* 1.188** 
 (0.313) (0.312) (0.336) (0.367) (0.404) (0.348) 
ACT English Score Equivalent 0.020 0.053* 0.061** 0.055* 0.060* 0.053* 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) 
ACT English Equivalent squared -0.001* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Missing ACT English Score Equivalent 0.005 0.203 0.262 0.204 0.247 0.250 
 (0.240) (0.243) (0.261) (0.285) (0.311) (0.268) 
Grants (first-semester, in $1,000s) -0.017+ -0.001 0.020+ 0.027* 0.033* 0.022+ 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) 
Loans (first-semester, in $1,000s) -0.010* -0.008+ -0.001 -0.000 0.010 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Scholarships (first-semester, in $1,000s) 0.110** 0.108** 0.107** 0.118** 0.119** 0.121** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) 
Transfer Hours 0.056** 0.041** 0.034** 0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Transfer Hours squared -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Part-Time Student (ever) -1.130** -0.770** -0.539** -0.392** -0.319** -0.244** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) 
First-Semester GPA 0.862** 0.904** 0.894** 0.860** 0.823** 0.807** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) 
Age at Matriculation       
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     13, omitted - - - - - - 
       
     14 -0.019 -1.696 0.247    
 (1.212) (1.215) (1.461)    
     15 -2.478* -3.822** -1.316** -0.738* -0.636 -0.388 
 (1.028) (1.022) (0.339) (0.312) (0.412) (0.288) 
     16 -0.783** -0.707** -0.428** -0.504** -0.422* -0.427** 
 (0.189) (0.139) (0.141) (0.150) (0.166) (0.141) 
     17 -0.035 0.127** 0.236** 0.248** 0.241** 0.175** 
 (0.047) (0.043) (0.048) (0.053) (0.058) (0.052) 
     19 0.363** 0.049 0.010 -0.001 -0.026 -0.100* 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.046) (0.051) (0.044) 
     20 0.591** 0.130** 0.052 -0.034 -0.076 -0.105+ 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.054) (0.058) (0.064) (0.056) 
     21 0.464** -0.044 -0.126* -0.182** -0.219** -0.333** 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.061) (0.066) (0.071) (0.063) 
     22 0.341** -0.146* -0.221** -0.264** -0.319** -0.449** 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.067) (0.073) (0.080) (0.069) 
     23 0.231** -0.340** -0.498** -0.589** -0.631** -0.739** 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.072) (0.078) (0.085) (0.074) 
     24 0.093 -0.427** -0.550** -0.583** -0.631** -0.791** 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.076) (0.083) (0.090) (0.078) 
     25 0.042 -0.501** -0.695** -0.820** -0.911** -1.004** 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.080) (0.085) (0.092) (0.081) 
     26 -0.076 -0.626** -0.777** -0.891** -1.019** -1.021** 
 (0.081) (0.082) (0.086) (0.092) (0.099) (0.087) 
     27 -0.012 -0.588** -0.766** -0.912** -0.992** -1.044** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.090) (0.096) (0.104) (0.091) 
     28 -0.159+ -0.745** -0.906** -1.027** -1.031** -1.202** 
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 (0.088) (0.089) (0.093) (0.099) (0.107) (0.093) 
     29 -0.197* -0.795** -0.928** -0.978** -1.073** -1.199** 
 (0.095) (0.096) (0.101) (0.109) (0.117) (0.101) 
     30 -0.043 -0.608** -0.815** -0.981** -1.040** -1.058** 
 (0.098) (0.101) (0.106) (0.114) (0.124) (0.107) 
     31 -0.079 -0.690** -0.761** -0.882** -0.908** -1.057** 
 (0.099) (0.100) (0.105) (0.112) (0.123) (0.106) 
     32 -0.148 -0.692** -0.885** -0.961** -1.050** -1.155** 
 (0.107) (0.109) (0.115) (0.121) (0.133) (0.115) 
     33 -0.192+ -0.754** -0.908** -0.867** -1.044** -1.182** 
 (0.110) (0.112) (0.116) (0.126) (0.134) (0.117) 
     34 -0.273* -0.876** -1.081** -1.259** -1.250** -1.284** 
 (0.116) (0.117) (0.123) (0.131) (0.140) (0.123) 
     35 -0.108 -0.804** -0.977** -1.115** -1.368** -1.239** 
 (0.119) (0.121) (0.126) (0.134) (0.145) (0.126) 
     36 -0.600** -1.139** -1.215** -1.245** -1.335** -1.411** 
 (0.134) (0.133) (0.139) (0.147) (0.159) (0.138) 
     37 -0.350** -1.000** -1.145** -1.236** -1.285** -1.365** 
 (0.130) (0.132) (0.138) (0.148) (0.160) (0.137) 
     38 -0.167 -0.630** -0.853** -0.928** -1.018** -1.165** 
 (0.141) (0.143) (0.149) (0.159) (0.170) (0.149) 
     39 -0.360* -0.911** -0.920** -1.084** -1.148** -1.258** 
 (0.142) (0.143) (0.150) (0.161) (0.175) (0.150) 
     40 -0.229 -0.845** -0.978** -1.282** -1.364** -1.288** 
 (0.154) (0.157) (0.167) (0.178) (0.191) (0.167) 
     41 -0.359* -0.914** -1.230** -1.345** -1.290** -1.367** 
 (0.144) (0.146) (0.154) (0.164) (0.182) (0.152) 
     42 -0.136 -0.574** -0.805** -0.943** -0.943** -1.011** 
 (0.167) (0.170) (0.180) (0.196) (0.207) (0.181) 
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     43 -0.686** -1.279** -1.396** -1.486** -1.573** -1.637** 
 (0.181) (0.186) (0.198) (0.207) (0.221) (0.196) 
     44 -0.342+ -0.964** -1.141** -1.137** -1.106** -1.330** 
 (0.195) (0.196) (0.209) (0.221) (0.236) (0.208) 
     45 -0.262 -0.850** -1.094** -1.297** -1.428** -1.302** 
 (0.190) (0.196) (0.204) (0.220) (0.232) (0.203) 
     46 -0.366+ -1.026** -1.021** -1.137** -1.401** -1.309** 
 (0.200) (0.199) (0.208) (0.220) (0.234) (0.207) 
     47 -0.547** -0.956** -1.220** -1.450** -1.592** -1.558** 
 (0.208) (0.208) (0.224) (0.239) (0.273) (0.221) 
     48 -0.337 -0.946** -1.205** -1.461** -1.558** -1.526** 
 (0.230) (0.236) (0.244) (0.267) (0.298) (0.243) 
     49 -0.567* -1.250** -1.330** -1.774** -1.848** -1.718** 
 (0.235) (0.240) (0.251) (0.266) (0.301) (0.250) 
     50 -0.223 -0.777** -1.021** -1.196** -1.262** -1.254** 
 (0.264) (0.258) (0.270) (0.292) (0.324) (0.266) 
     51 -0.242 -0.971** -1.371** -1.306** -1.662** -1.587** 
 (0.307) (0.304) (0.323) (0.330) (0.364) (0.311) 
     52 -0.727** -1.352** -1.282** -1.432** -1.481** -1.519** 
 (0.275) (0.278) (0.278) (0.306) (0.333) (0.277) 
     53 -0.598* -1.061** -1.422** -1.552** -1.804** -1.765** 
 (0.275) (0.277) (0.301) (0.316) (0.356) (0.297) 
     54 -0.374 -1.127** -1.218** -1.351** -1.314** -1.640** 
 (0.338) (0.337) (0.342) (0.373) (0.399) (0.336) 
     55 -0.647+ -1.322** -1.720** -1.292** -0.915* -1.600** 
 (0.373) (0.377) (0.407) (0.422) (0.454) (0.391) 
     56 0.523 -0.007 -0.015 -0.124 -0.499 -0.367 
 (0.459) (0.450) (0.481) (0.500) (0.532) (0.480) 
     57 -0.899+ -1.844** -2.231** -2.250** -2.375** -1.898** 
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 (0.530) (0.560) (0.573) (0.575) (0.642) (0.520) 
     58 -0.296 -0.905* -1.405** -1.504** -1.205* -1.692** 
 (0.447) (0.458) (0.473) (0.492) (0.554) (0.468) 
     59 -0.306 -0.425 -0.863 -0.926 -0.859 -0.640 
 (0.550) (0.516) (0.613) (0.640) (0.680) (0.641) 
     60 -0.437 -1.360+ -0.742 -0.409 0.633 -0.106 
 (0.738) (0.731) (0.761) (0.778) (1.109) (0.868) 
     61 -0.762 -1.688* -1.479* -1.326 -1.287 -1.437* 
 (0.828) (0.831) (0.742) (0.892) (0.937) (0.700) 
     62 -2.473** -3.085** -1.883** -2.595** -2.441** -2.405** 
 (0.763) (0.773) (0.568) (0.678) (0.698) (0.559) 
     63 -1.030+ -1.329* -1.856* -2.373+ -2.546* -2.248** 
 (0.620) (0.602) (0.730) (1.242) (1.236) (0.734) 
     64 -1.430+ -1.268 -1.680+ -1.761* -2.296* -2.244** 
 (0.813) (0.879) (0.864) (0.881) (1.163) (0.860) 
     65 -2.175* -2.963** -2.490* -2.240+ -2.072+ -2.025* 
 (1.075) (1.082) (1.130) (1.151) (1.210) (0.901) 
     66, omitted - - -   - 
       
     67 -1.927+ -1.887* -1.550* -1.229 -2.097* -2.050** 
 (1.108) (0.863) (0.777) (0.881) (0.930) (0.776) 
     68 -1.184 -2.088* -1.749* -1.790+ -2.153+ -2.101** 
 (0.864) (0.870) (0.790) (0.914) (1.204) (0.773) 
     69, omitted - - - - - - 
       
     70, omitted - - - - - - 
       
     71, omitted - - - - - - 
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     Table 20 (continued)       
       
     72, omitted - - - - - - 
       
     73, omitted - - - - - - 
       
     76, omitted - - - - - - 
       
     79, omitted - - -   - 
       
     83, omitted - - - - - - 
       
     85, omitted - -     
       
Term of Entry       
     Spring 2004 -0.255** -0.230** -0.242** -0.247** -0.264** -0.335** 
 (0.077) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074) 
     Summer 2004 -0.165 -0.316** -0.370** -0.381** -0.368** -0.473** 
 (0.101) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) 
     Fall 2004 -0.157** -0.058 -0.063 -0.059 -0.072 -0.097+ 
 (0.054) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.053) 
     Spring 2005 -0.020 -0.127+ -0.179* -0.160* -0.162* -0.274** 
 (0.080) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) 
     Summer 2005 0.034 -0.153 -0.143 -0.126 -0.112 -0.234* 
 (0.109) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.107) (0.109) 
     Fall 2005 -0.036 -0.001 -0.013 0.006 0.038 -0.065 
 (0.054) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) 
     Spring 2006 -0.085 -0.088 -0.141+ -0.149* -0.118 -0.243** 
 (0.076) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.077) 
     Summer 2006 0.041 -0.090 -0.072 -0.057 -0.060 -0.269** 
 (0.102) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.104) 
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     Table 20 (continued)       
       
     Fall 2006 -0.032 -0.037 -0.051 -0.044 -0.030 -0.169** 
 (0.054) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) 
     Spring 2007 -0.088 -0.142* -0.107 -0.070 -0.044 -0.250** 
 (0.075) (0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.076) 
     Summer 2007 -0.237* -0.327** -0.313** -0.277** -0.239* -0.471** 
 (0.104) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) 
     Fall 2007 0.014 0.052 0.054 0.024 0.012 -0.178** 
 (0.052) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) 
     Spring 2008 -0.007 -0.071 -0.083 -0.061 -0.065 -0.292** 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.077) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) 
     Summer 2008 0.076 -0.104 -0.183+ -0.149 -0.139 -0.407** 
 (0.103) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) (0.104) 
     Fall 2008 0.020 0.084+ 0.064 0.056 0.048 -0.213** 
 (0.052) (0.048) (0.049) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053) 
     Spring 2009 -0.148* -0.185* -0.174* -0.138+ -0.148* -0.430** 
 (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.076) 
     Summer 2009 0.034 -0.102 -0.120 -0.114 -0.128 -0.414** 
 (0.104) (0.102) (0.103) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106) 
     Fall 2009 0.000 -0.026 -0.016 -0.044  -0.410** 
 (0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.051)  (0.052) 
     Spring 2010 -0.209** -0.253** -0.259** -0.281**  -0.616** 
 (0.072) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071)  (0.072) 
     Summer 2010 -0.377** -0.353** -0.329** -0.354**  -0.741** 
 (0.108) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)  (0.104) 
     Fall 2010 -0.075 -0.070 -0.084+   -0.585** 
 (0.051) (0.048) (0.049)   (0.052) 
     Spring 2011 0.040 -0.011 0.018   -0.478** 
 (0.075) (0.073) (0.074)   (0.075) 
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     Table 20 (continued)       
       
     Summer 2011 -0.250* -0.208* -0.245*   -0.697** 
 (0.106) (0.104) (0.105)   (0.105) 
     Fall 2011 -0.061 -0.049     
 (0.051) (0.048)     
     Spring 2012 -0.203** -0.260**     
 (0.075) (0.072)     
     Summer 2012 -0.127 -0.217*     
 (0.101) (0.097)     
     Fall 2012 0.018      
 (0.050)      
     Spring 2013 -0.151*      
 (0.075)      
     Summer 2013 -0.342**      
 (0.101)      
     14, omitted    - - - 
       
Constant -1.303* -1.088+ -0.994 -1.336+ -2.008* -0.936 
 (0.644) (0.636) (0.674) (0.731) (0.790) (0.682) 
       
Observations 65,125 57,731 50,611 43,601 36,660 50,608 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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